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Abstract
This thesis addresses the following question: How should domes-
tic networks be reinvented to support self-management by domestic
users? It takes a user-centred design approach to redesign the underly-
ing domestic network infrastructure to better fit domestic users. The
overall aim of this work is to create user-centred mechanisms to sup-
port self-management of domestic networks by domestic users. Two
areas of the domestic network are studied in detail, user-centred mech-
anisms for domestic network infrastructure control and user-centred
presentations of network data.
User-centred mechanisms for domestic network infrastructure control
are explored to improve Wi-Fi device association in domestic envi-
ronments. A user-centred design approach is adopted to create a new
method for sharing Wi-Fi credentials between devices, specifically tai-
lored for domestic environments called MultiNet. The network per-
formance impact of MultiNet is quantified using the standard metrics
of throughput, latency, and jitter in a lab based experiment. Multi-
Net’s usability is then compared to Wi-Fi Protected Setup in a lab
based usability evaluation. These show that better Wi-Fi device as-
sociation methods targeted for domestic environments can be built.
It also shows that user-centred networking infrastructure can support
self-management by domestic users.
User-centred presentations of network data address the poor legi-
bility of domestic networks hinders configuration and maintenance
of them. A user-centred approach is adopted to design and con-
struct a network data visualisation and annotation platform, Home-
NetViewer. Through a series of deployments in real households the
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HomeNetViewer platform is used to explore user-centred presenta-
tions of network data to support the local negotiation of domestic
network policy. HomeNetViewer improves domestic network legibility
by enabling the construction of user-centred presentations of domestic
network data. Additionally, it shows that users are comfortable anno-
tating their network data using activities, applications, and users as
a vocabulary. Together this highlights, with the correct user-centred
tools, that domestic users are able to gain new insight into their net-
works to support self-management. HomeNetViewer also shows that
manually annotating domestic traffic place an ongoing burden on the
users.
Automating user-centred presentations of network data are explored
to address the burden the annotation process places on users. The use
of enterprise traffic classification techniques to generate user-centred
presentations of network data struggle to classify the data annotated
by HomeNetViewer participants. It concludes by suggesting two ways
in which these difficulties could be addressed in future work.
Overall the domestic access point provides an important point of con-
figuration, visibility and control over the domestic network infras-
tructure. This dissertation demonstrates that taking a user-centred
design approach to reinventing the domestic network, to support self-
management by users, can resolve the existing problems and merits
further research and exploration by industry and standardisation bod-
ies.
ii
Acknowledgements
My sincere thanks go to my supervisor, Prof Tom Rodden and Dr
Richard Mortier. Thank you for your guidance and your wisdom dur-
ing these last five years. I would also like to acknowledge The Univer-
sity of Nottingham and the RCUK Digital Economy programme their
financial support which made this all possible. In particular, I would
like to thank the staff and students in the Doctoral Training Centre
for sharing and enriching the PhD experience.
This thesis is dedicated to my children Zach and Sophie. You have
made me stronger, better and more tired than I could have ever imag-
ined. Your thirst for knowledge and endless curiosity is an inspiration.
My wife, Beth also deserves a special thank you. Her endless patience,
unwavering belief, organisational skills and ability to make me laugh
helped me through the most challenging times. The continued sup-
port and encouragement provided by my wider family and friends was
also invaluable throughout.
Finally, I would like to thank my participants. Without your trust
and kindness this work would not have been possible. Thank you.
Contents
Contents i
List of Figures iv
List of Tables vi
List of Publications vii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 User-centred mechanisms for domestic network infrastructure control 4
1.2 User-centred presentations of network data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Automating user-centred presentations of network data . . . . . . 7
1.4 Thesis structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Background 9
2.1 Domestic networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 The domestic context of networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Domestic network challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Addressing the challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Wi-Fi device association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 Legibility of domestic networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 User-centred mechanisms for domestic network infrastructure
control 31
3.1 MultiNet design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 MultiNet implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 MultiNet usability analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
i
CONTENTS
3.3.1 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Network performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Device connection time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.7 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4 User-centred presentations of network activity 62
4.1 System design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1.1 Ethical considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1.2 Prototype interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1.3 Iterative design with home-owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1.4 Test deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 The final system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.1 Interactive visualisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.2 Annotation capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 HomeNetViewer deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.2 Participating households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3.3 Results: data annotations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3.4 Results: exit interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.5 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5 Automatic generation of user-centred presentations of network
activity from IP Flow records 102
5.1 Performance metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2 Dataset and classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3 Classification algorithm and feature selection . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
ii
CONTENTS
5.4.1 Household 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4.2 Household 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4.3 Household 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4.4 Household 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6 Conclusion 125
6.1 Key lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.1.1 User-centred mechanisms for domestic network infrastruc-
ture control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.1.2 User-centred presentations of network activity . . . . . . . 126
6.1.3 Automatic generation of User-centred presentations from
IP Flow records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.2 Open challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.2.1 User-centred mechanisms for domestic network infrastruc-
ture control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.2.2 User-centred presentations of network activity . . . . . . . 128
6.2.3 Automatic generation of User-centred presentations from
IP Flow records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.3 Next steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
References 132
iii
List of Figures
3.1 Overview of MultiNet implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 MultiNet Network Controller interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 MultiNet interactions to add a device [16]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Laptop client device with MultiNet QR Code encoded credentials. 42
3.5 Instructions for adding the printer to the network for WPS (top)
and MultiNet (bottom). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6 Evidence for the learnability of MultiNet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.7 Device to access point network performance as the number of con-
figured networks increases. The mean ± standard error is shown . 53
3.8 Average device connection time (s). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 A system overview of HomeNetViewer data collection and annota-
tion platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Final annotation interface for a single device. . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3 Host/domain annotation interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4 One day’s annotated traffic combined (all devices) in household 1 86
4.5 One day’s annotated data for a shared device in household 1 . . . 100
4.6 An example of the visibility of H2U4s’ daily routine and unknown
traffic at odd times of night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.1 Classifier performance H1UT dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Classifier performance H1AT dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3 Classifier performance H1UT dataset with increasing number of
estimators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4 Classifier performance H1AT dataset with increasing number of
estimators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
iv
LIST OF FIGURES
5.5 H1UV confusion matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.6 H1AV confusion matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.7 H2UV confusion matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.8 H2AV confusion matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.9 H3UV confusion matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.10 H3AV confusion matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.11 H4UV confusion matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
v
List of Tables
3.1 Prior exposure to WPS and QR Codes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 User trial participant age range. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1 Household 1 participant information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2 Household 2 participant information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Household 3 participant information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Household 4 participant information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.5 Annotations entered per household per annotation type . . . . . . 85
5.1 Description of the Flow data collected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.2 H1UV classification results, optimistic precision shown in () . . . 115
5.3 H1AV classification results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4 H2UV classification results, optimistic precision shown in () . . . 119
5.5 H2AV classification results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.6 H3UV classification results, optimistic precision shown in () . . . 120
5.7 H3AV classification results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.8 H4UV classification results, optimistic precision shown in () . . . 122
vi
List of Publications
[1] Brown, A., Mortier, R., and Rodden, T. Multinet: Reducing interaction
overhead in domestic wireless networks. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems (New York, NY, USA,2013), CHI 13,
ACM, pp. 1569-1578
[2] Brown, A., Mortier, R., and Rodden, T. An exploration of user recognition
on domestic networks using netflow records. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM
International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing: Adjunct
Publication (2014), UbiComp 14 Adjunct, ACM, pp. 903-910.
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis addresses the following question: How should domestic networks be
reinvented to support self-management by domestic users?
Empirical studies have highlighted many issues with currently deployed do-
mestic networks. How they are supported, maintained, and expanded have been
shown to be problematic. These problems have been the focus of much research
within the Human Computer Interaction community (HCI) over the past 10 years.
Many attempts to address the problems found within domestic networks, fo-
cus solely on improving the user interface to the network, adding a layer of “in-
terface veneer” on top of the complex underlying network infrastructure. This
approach has had limited impact on commercially available domestic networking
hardware. The usability of currently available domestic networking equipment is
still problematic.
This dissertation argues that the root cause of many domestic network us-
ability problems is the transplantation of the complex underlying networking
protocols from corporate environments to the home. Networking protocols have
migrated from corporate environments to domestic environments with little or no
consideration for the domestic context, its users, or their goals.
Users are often faced with complex technical interfaces when performing basic
network tasks. While better user interfaces may improve the situation, they
cannot fully solve the usability problems inherent in today’s domestic networks
in isolation.
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This dissertation explores another direction, taking a user-centred design ap-
proach to redesign the underlying network infrastructure. The overall aim of
this work is to create user-centred mechanisms to support self-management of
domestic networks by domestic users,reinventing the networking infrastructure
as required.
A case study style approach is taken to unpack the overarching question of
this dissertation. Each case study will focus on one particular usability problem
within domestic networks. The problems that will be tackled are identified by
reviewing the existing literature on domestic network usability. A user-centred
approach is adopted in each case study with the aim of reinventing the supporting
domestic network infrastructure to support self-management by users.
Before continuing it is worth considering, why do domestic networks need to be
reinvented? After all, domestic networks are now commonplace, and have become
an unremarkable feature of everyday life [24]. Domestic networks are routinely
used to access a vast array of content and services on a daily basis. Despite
their widespread deployment the management, configuration, and control of this
domestic resource imposes a significant technical burden on their users [13, 29, 79].
Domestic networks are built using a host of protocols, tools, and technolo-
gies designed for use on the wider Internet and in enterprise networks. These
protocols were created assuming the presence of trained professional network en-
gineers to configure and maintain them. In contrast, users of domestic networks
are not usually trained networking professionals, and are not motivated to ac-
quire the necessary skills. The documented issues with current domestic network
deployments are reviewed in detail in Chapter 2.
Previous approaches to addressing domestic network usability have assumed
that the underlying network infrastructure is immutable, only focusing on im-
proving their user interface. However, recently a new approach to domestic net-
work research has emerged. Edwards et al., first highlighted the need for HCI
researchers to engage pro-actively with the development of networking infrastruc-
ture in 2010 [31]. Since then a small number of researchers have begun to explore
the benefits of altering the domestic network infrastructure.
Mortier et al., have shown, that by carefully altering the configuration of
the underlying network protocols new possibilities for user interaction can be
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created [63]. Chetty et al., have explored exposing network bandwidth usage to
domestic users on situated displays, and have shown it to be beneficial [20].
It is upon this work that this dissertation aims to build, by taking a user-
centred design approach to reinventing parts of the domestic network infrastruc-
ture. It is not proposed to create a whole new set of protocols specifically for
domestic environments. Changing them, adding new features, and altering how
they are deployed and/or used to create domestic specific solutions is a key aspect
to this work.
The three areas that the case studies will explore are: User-centred mecha-
nisms for infrastructure control, User-centred presentations of network activity
and Automating user-centred presentations of network data. These areas are very
different, each has its own challenges, and they are best evaluated using different
methods. Hence, a mixed methods approach to evaluation is adopted, select-
ing the most appropriate evaluation techniques as required. However, the case
studies are explored useing the same underlying approach: user-centred design.
It has been long established that user-centred design helps create useful, us-
able, and desirable products through an early focus on user requirements. User-
centred design was first described by Donald Norman in 1986 thus:
“user-centred design emphasizes that the purpose of the system is to
serve the user, not to use a specific technology, not to be an elegant
piece of programming. The needs of the users should dominate the
design of the interface, and the needs of the interface should dominate
the design of the rest of the system.” [64]
The generally accepted principles of user-centred design are: an early focus on
users and tasks, empirical measurement, and iterative design [35].This is further
expanded by Pereece et al., who suggest adding five principles to clarify “an early
focus on users” [73]. These are:
1 Users’ tasks and goals are the driving force behind development.
2 The system should be redesigned to support users’ behaviour and context-
of-use.
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3 Users’ characteristics are captured and designed for.
4 Users should be consulted throughout development cycle and their input
should be seriously taken into account.
5 All design decisions are taken within the context of the users, their work
and their environment.
These five principles place the user at the centre of the design process. How-
ever, this does not mean that the users make all the design decisions, but rather,
that the designer should remain aware of the user requirements when making
design decisions. Pereece et al., also suggest that providing an accessible set of
data about user requirements can help designers focus on users’ needs. The focus
of user-centred design on the users’ tasks and goals within their context and envi-
ronment is an ideal lens, through which to explore the issues of domestic network
usability.
Thus, the underlying approach adopted, is to apply user-centred design to
build a number of technology probes [43]. An analysis of the relevant literature
and the domestic context is used to guide the design of the technology probes.
They are then employed as a tool to elicit user feedback and test the technical
limitations of our alterations, using the most appropriate method. Lab based
experiments and a number of quantitative methods are used to measure the ef-
ficiency and effectiveness of our systems. These are complemented by real world
deployments and qualitative methods to collect and report user feedback. Next,
more detail is provided describing each case study.
1.1 User-centred mechanisms for domestic net-
work infrastructure control
Building, configuring, and repairing domestic networks is a complex task. When
users wish to setup a new, fix a problem with, or add devices to an existing
network, they are forced to interact with the complex underlying network infras-
tructure. This interaction can take many forms: web interfaces, operating system
dialogues, and physical interaction are all supported modalities.
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The protocols used in domestic networks were not designed with unskilled
domestic users in-mind. The mismatch in knowledge and skills makes the task of
constructing and modifying networks time consuming, and frustrating for most
users. This section of the dissertation explores taking a user-centred approach to
redesigning domestic network infrastructure to support user-centred mechanisms
for infrastructure control.
One aspect of infrastructure control is selected to study in detail, namely,
Wi-Fi device association. Wi-Fi device association is a particularly problematic
interaction with domestic network infrastructure. It involves making security
related decisions and entering security related information in a variety of different
ways.
Improving Wi-Fi device association has been the focus of many academic
studies. However, it is still one aspect of domestic network configuration that
causes significant frustration for domestic users. To further understand what it
means to build a user-centred mechanism for Wi-Fi device association in domestic
environments, several sub questions will be explored. These are:
Q2.0 Are User-centred mechanisms for infrastructure control beneficial for do-
mestic networks?
Q2.1 How should Wi-Fi device association be changed to better fit domestic
environments?
Q2.2 How much do the underlying protocols involved with Wi-Fi device associ-
ation need to be changed to better fit domestic environments?
Q2.3 What are the network performance implications of the redesigned infras-
tructure?
Q2.4 How does the usability of the new method compare to existing device
association methods?
These questions are addressed in Chapter 3. A user-centred design approach
is adopted to create a new method for sharing Wi-Fi credentials between de-
vices, specifically tailored for domestic environments. Question 2.0 is addressed
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by reviewing the existing literature on usability issues with, and suggested im-
provements to, the Wi-Fi device association process. This literature review is
then used to draw-up a set of design principles for the development of a new
association method.
The design principles are then used to implement a new system which con-
forms to them, called MultiNet [16]. The modifications made to existing Wi-Fi
device association protocols in the construction of MultiNet are documented to
answer question 2.2. Question 2.3 is then covered by assessing the impact of
MultiNet on network performance using the standard metrics of throughput, la-
tency, and jitter in a lab based experiment. The usability of MultiNet is then
compared to Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS), the current state-of-the-art in usable
device association. The usability comparison of MultiNet and WPS is assessed
using a lab based user study and semi-structured interviews. The results of the
usability studies are presented to answer question 2.4.
Chapter 3 shows, that by taking a user-centred approach, better Wi-Fi device
association methods targeted for domestic environments can be built. It also
shows that user-centred networking infrastructure can support self-management
by domestic users.
1.2 User-centred presentations of network data
The literature review shows that poor legibility hinders configuration and mainte-
nance of domestic network infrastructures. Improving domestic network legibility
is an important problem to address. Improving legibility also has applications in
supporting the local negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of domestic network
policies. This section of the dissertation looks at how user-centred presentations
of network data can be used to improve domestic network legibility to support
self-management by domestic users. It addresses four important questions:
Q3.0 Do user-centred presentations of network data improve network legibility?
Q3.1 Of the data flowing through the domestic network access point, which are
best suited for use in user annotation?
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Q3.2 Are interactive time-series historical visualisation appropriate in the con-
text of domestic network data?
Q3.3 Is the use of activities, applications and users an appropriate language to
annotate domestic network data?
Q3.4 How do users feel about the increased network legibility?
To explore the questions above, a user-centred approach is adopted to de-
sign and construct a network data visualisation and annotation platform, Home-
NetViewer [17]. HomeNetViewer is specifically designed for use in domestic en-
vironments by non-expert users. Through a series of deployments in real house-
holds the HomeNetViewer platform is used to explore user-centred presentations
of network data to support the local negotiation of domestic network policy.
Chapter 4 shows that HomeNetViewer improves domestic network legibility by
enabling the construction of user-centred presentations of domestic network data.
Additionally, it shows that users are comfortable annotating their network data
using activities, applications, and users as a vocabulary. Together this highlights,
with the correct user-centred tools, that domestic users are able to gain new
insight into their networks to support self-management.
1.3 Automating user-centred presentations of net-
work data
The work undertaken to address user-centred presentations of network data found
that the annotation process places a significant time burden on users. Despite
the benefits of HomeNetViewer, this issue limits its utility. To address this an
exploration of applying enterprise traffic classification to automate the annotation
process is undertaken. The question this section addresses is:
Q4.0 Can enterprise traffic classification techniques be used with user contributed
annotations to automatically annotate domestic network traffic?
A review of the current enterprise traffic classification literature is undertaken
to highlight current practice in this area. Then the highlighted techniques are
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tested agents the HomeNetViewer dataset generated in the HomeNetViewer de-
ployment described in Chapter 4.
The outcome of this chapter is that current enterprise traffic classification
techniques struggle to classify the data annotated by HomeNetViewer, for several
reasons. It concludes by suggesting two ways in which these difficulties could
be addressed in future work. The next section outlines the structure of the
dissertation.
1.4 Thesis structure
The three strands of this dissertation explore different issues affecting domestic
network usability. However, they share a common user-centred approach. They
focus on how the domestic network infrastructure should be modified to better
support self-management by users. They consider where the user should be in-
cluded in the process and what is the most appropriate form of the interaction,
within a domestic setting, to support the users’ goals.
Chapter 2 presents the related work in four main sections. First, the academic
work supporting the assertion that domestic networks need to be reinvented is
provided, before exploring the literature on domestic network usability problems.
Second, a detailed review of secure device association is presented to support the
work on reinventing Wi-Fi device association, in Chapter 3. Third, the literature
addressing domestic network legibility to support the work contained in Chapter 4
is reviewed. Finally, enterprise traffic classification is covered to support the work
in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3 presents the work undertaken to address Wi-Fi device association,
Chapter 4 covers the work relating to domestic network legibility and Chapter 5
explores enterprise traffic classification in domestic environments. The final chap-
ter draws together the key lessons learned and open questions from Chapters 3,
4 and 5.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter overviews the existing literature pertaining to domestic networks
and their users. First, an overview of the current technical implementation of
domestic network infrastructure is given. Then discussion of the context and
challenges of domestic networks is presented alongside literature pertaining to
them. Following on from this, a detailed review of the literature related to Wi-Fi
device association and enterprise traffic classification is presented to support the
work in this thesis.
2.1 Domestic networks
Domestic networks are now common place and have become an unremarkable
feature of everyday life [24]. These networks are used to access a vast array
of content and services on a daily basis. Despite their widespread deployment
the management, configuration, and control of this domestic resource imposes a
significant technical burden their users [13, 29, 79]. This dissertation explores
a user-centred approach to redesigning the domestic network infrastructure to
address these issues.
Domestic networking technologies are not currently specifically standard-
ised. Instead, current deployments are constructed using a number of recognised
standards. Each manufacturer is free to chose the standards they implement.
Thankfully, for the sake of compatibility with the wider Internet, most domestic
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networking technology commercially available are based on the Internet protocol
suite.
The Internet protocol suite is published by Institute of Electrical and Electron-
ics Engineers (IEEE). It is fundamentally concerned with how data is transmitted
over a physical medium from one system to another over a network. Hence it is
the foundation of many different types of network, including domestic networks.
Networks also require a number of other protocols to operate effectively. These
are built on top of the Internet protocol suite. These protocols are standardised
by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), whose mission is “to make the
Internet work better”. Standards developed by both the IEEE and IETF are
commonly used in domestic networks and are described in more detail below.
The Internet protocol suite is constructed using a layered approach. Each
layer provides a specific set of functionality that is exposed to the layers above
and below. Each layer operates independently of other layers. This maximises the
flexibility and minimises the complexity for developers and network engineers [33].
The Internet protocol suite is built using four layers: link layer, Internet layer,
Transport layer and Application layer. Each layer can be implemented using a
number of protocols depending on the required properties of the network being
constructed. Domestic networks use a common set of protocols at each layer. The
function of each layer, and the common protocols used in domestic networks are
described next. The Internet protocol runs on top of a fifth layer, the physical
layer.
The physical layer describes the basic network hardware required to construct
a network. It specifies the means of transmitting raw bits from one over a physical
link connecting two nodes. The physical layer provides the functionality required
to communicate directly between two nodes directly connected by a physical
link. Many different types of physical layer technologies are deployed in the
wider Internet. However, only three are commonly used in domestic networking.
These are: IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, and it newer variants [3], IEEE 802.11 Wireless
LANs [4], and IEEE 1901 Standard for Broadband over Power Line Networks [2].
Wireless LANs are implemented using radio frequency technologies, which are
easily intercepted as they penetrate physical boundaries. To overcome this se-
curity limitation, communications over Wireless LANs are often encrypted using
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Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2). WPA2 is standardised in IEEE 802.11i-
2004 [1]. WPA2 is now the standard protocol of choice for Wi-Fi security in
domestic environments. Many domestic access points also support Wi-Fi Pro-
tected Setup (WPS), that is designed to address the complexities of configuring
WPA2 enabled devices. WPS, created by the Wi-Fi Alliance 1 and introduced in
2006, is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.
The Internet layer is commonly provided by the Internet Protocol version 4
(IPv4). IPv4 specifies best effort end-to-end communication over packet switched
networks. IPv4 was created to route traffic over the Internet. The current imple-
mentation of IPv4 is described in RFC791 and was first published in 1981 [71].
RFC791 is specifically limited in scope and deals with the fundamental functions
necessary to deliver data from one host to another over an interconnected system
of networks. IPv4 provides detailed information on host addressing, packet for-
mat/structure and packet fragmentation and reassembly. The roll-out of Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) in domestic environments has not begun. However it
may be deployed in future.
The Transport layer is implemented using two main protocols in domestic,
corporate, and backbone networks. These are Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). TCP was first described in 1974 [19]
and later standardised, September 1981 in RFC793 [72]. It provides a connection
orientated, end-to-end, reliable, in order communication channel between pairs of
processes running on host computers attached to interconnected networks. UDP
is a simpler protocol, standardised in RFC768 [70]. It provides a connectionless,
end-to-end communication between pairs of processes attached to interconnected
networks, but makes no guarantee that the data will arrive or that it will arrive
in order.
The application layer encapsulates the high-level communications protocols
used in process-to-process communications over a network. Many of today’s ap-
plication protocols are built on top of UDP. Two such protocols that are funda-
mental to the operation of domestic networks are Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) [28] and Domain Name System (DNS) [59]. DHCP provides
a framework for passing configuration information to hosts on a IP network. It
1http://www.wi-fi.org/
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enables the automatic configuration of IP addresses and other configuration infor-
mation to boot strap devices onto an IP network. DNS is a protocol and service
that is used to translate human-readable domain names into machine-readable
IP addresses. Protocols built on top of TCP are used where more reliable com-
munication is required, such as, HTTP and HTTPS.
Each layer requires careful configuration, as misconfiguration at any layer can
cause poor performance or broken connectivity. In domestic environments some
of this configuration is performed upfront by the router designers. They select
the appropriate parts of the network stack, and set sensible defaults for the many
configuration parameters, for example choosing the internal IP range for the
network. Domestic access points make many of these settings editable through a
web interface delivered over the local network. This upfront configuration shields
the domestic user from many of these complexities as long as everything is working
correctly.
However, domestic networks are dynamic: new devices are added, new soft-
ware installed, and operating systems are updated. When changes are made or
things go wrong, the user is required to interact with the networking infrastruc-
ture. At these points of interaction, the user is often confronted with complex in-
terfaces filled with technical terminology. Recent usability studies into the major
brands of domestic networking devices show that they “use a complex, feature-
oriented, rudimentary user interface (UI) design with terms that are understood
by a very small percentage of people” [58].
Domestic networks are built using a host of protocols, tools, and technologies
described above. They are designed for use on the wider Internet and enterprise
networks to enable efficient, secure, and reliable access to the wider Internet.
These technologies are complex and time consuming to deploy, and often require
expert knowledge to configure. The complexity and technical focus of domestic
networking infrastructure is a barrier to adoption for domestic users and are the
cause of many usability problems. Next, a discussion of the domestic user is
presented, paying attention to the differences between them and enterprise users.
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2.2 The domestic context of networks
The domestic context is complex, and has many facets that make it an interesting
diverse environment to study. Understanding the domestic context is key to
properly applying a user-centred design approach. The domestic context is made
up of the: domestic users, a home, and the technology used by its occupants.
The evolution of modern digital content and services has significantly changed
the role of domestic networks in recent times. Domestic networks are built using
the same protocols and tools that were developed for the Internet as a whole.
While these have proven to be flexible, they were designed with a certain set of
assumptions for a particular context-of-use: assuming trustworthy hosts, trained
network administrators, and scalability to millions of nodes. This section looks at
domestic users, the domestic environment and how they interact with networking
technologies deployed within them. The first step required to apply user-centred
design is to understand the users’ goals and behaviours, alongside the context-of-
use.
The domestic user: Domestic users are usually not trained networking profes-
sionals [30]. This means that domestic networks are predominantly self managed
by non-expert users who have little interest in networking technology. This is
supported by the findings of Grinter etal. who find that users are unable to ver-
bally articulate information about their networks [38]. To make matters worse
only a small percentage of domestic users understand the complex terminology
used in network infrastructure interfaces and tools [58]. The mismatch between
the assumption that networks will be managed by trained networking profession-
als and the knowledge of domestic users, contributes to many of the usability
problems that are found in domestic networks.
Domestic users also have different goals to enterprise users. Domestic users
do not have a shared goal, to produce a product or deliver a service, as is the case
for enterprise users. Instead they have a diverse range of disparate concerns [25].
Poole et al. find that domestic users think differently about networks to
networking experts [68]. They used householder-created sketch network diagrams
to assess how people visualised their network infrastructure. This is supported
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by the field work undertaken by Brundell in [18]. They find that domestic users
reason about their network in teams of activities, applications, and users rather
than IP addresses, ports, and protocols of networking professionals.
These factors combined make designing for domestic users different to de-
signing for enterprise users. However, understanding the user is only part of the
problem. To fully explore the domestic networking infrastructure the context
into which it is deployed must also be taken into consideration. This is discussed
next.
The domestic context: Domestic networks are somewhat different to enter-
prise networks: they have a small number of nodes, are predominantly self man-
aged by non-expert users and contain a variety of devices from PCs to fridges.
Domestic networks are also situated in the domestic context. These are rich di-
verse and dynamic social environments. O’Brien and Rodden explore the role of
interactive domestic technologies in domestic environments and argue that there
is a distinction between designing technologies for the home and for work [65].
They highlight four areas that impact the design of interactive technologies for
the home: daily routine, ownership of space, coordination of home life and man-
agement of ‘overloaded space’.
Poole et al. also come to similar conclusions when they specifically stud-
ied domestic networks [68]. They suggest three areas where current networking
infrastructure needs to improve to support self-management by users. Firstly,
designing for time as the evolving nature of the domestic network require the
design of tools that can archive the state of the network to enable changes to be
tracked. Second, designing for space. The physical arrangement of devices in the
home has a meaning to its occupants, and impacts the usage and policies for a
particular device. For example, some parents would like to restrict access to the
Internet in the children’s bedrooms. Finally, designing for household routines.
The social aspects of the household often affect the operation of the domestic
network infrastructure.
This work highlights the subtle interplay between the routines, practices, and
arrangement of physical space in the domestic environment with networking tech-
nology. This interaction between technology and the social aspects of domestic
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environments has been explored by a number of researchers focusing on domestic
networks. Their work is discussed next.
Socio-technical aspects of domestic networks: Empirical studies by Grin-
ter et al. revealed that domestic networks are characterised by “coordination
challenges” [38]. For example, troubleshooting, network administration, con-
figuration and management of shared resources all require coordinated action.
Furthermore, the domestic network is influenced by the relationships and power
structures within the household, Occupants create locally negotiated norms and
expected behaviours of network usage and the devices connected to it [88].
This “local negotiation” or “collaborative management” between occupants is
further explored by Crabtree et. al. who studied a comic-book style interface for
domestic network policy creation and configuration [26]. Their results suggest
“network policy in domestic contexts ... are shaped by and answerable to the
moral reasoning that governs domestic life.”.
Crabtree et. al. also highlight three properties of domestic network policy
making: network rules are about people, network rules are socially situated and
network rules are open to interpretation and renegotiation. These make formal
specification and automatic enforcement of domestic network policy undesirable.
These findings have significant implications for the design of domestic network
policy systems. Crabtree et. al. provide two important reflections on their work
that directly influence this thesis.
Network policy lives in the home not the network. Domestic network pol-
icy are framed in the wider social context of the domestic environment. They
are understandings and agreements that are processed in the social context and
renegotiated as necessary. In contrast, enterprise network policy is predominantly
about the network itself and the things attached to it. Enterprise network pol-
icy is often formally specified and evolves slowly with the changing need of the
enterprise. The flexibility of domestic network policy makes systems that try to
enforce them impractical.
Many policies will remain unwritten. Rules do not require formal specifica-
tion for their use. In these cases Crabtree et. al. suggest, “it is more useful
to convey awareness of network activities that are relevant to rule use, enabling
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members to surreptitiously monitor what is happening in the environment and
take appropriate action.” [26]. This approach recognises the limitation of the
technology to understand the rapidly adapting domestic context. Instead it fo-
cuses on supporting users by improving their situational awareness enabling them
to take informed action as they see fit.
2.3 Domestic network challenges
Many domestic network users have to perform tasks that would not look out
of place in large corporate networks, such as configuration of routers, cabling,
backups, troubleshooting and fault resolution. In ‘Home networking and HCI:
what hath god wrought?’ Shehan and Edwards discuss some of the complexities
of the home network stating six factors that combine to create complexity [79].
These are:
1. Multiplicity and complexity of the devices.
2. The need to coordinate with outside agencies.
3. The division of labour.
4. The lack of planning.
5. The need for security configuration.
6. The invisibility of the infrastructure.
The impact of each is discussed in turn below.
Multiplicity and complexity of the devices . Domestic networks must
support a bewildering array of devices, from PCs and mobile phones, to fridges
and thermostats. These devices have different purposes and are often designed
by different manufacturers. Each device has its own set of hardware and software
that must be compatible with the network to function. Devices often require con-
figuration to function correctly, and each offers its own interface to accomplish
this task. These interfaces are individually designed and are often inconsistent
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between devices from different manufacturers. Each device also has its own in-
teraction affordances. Some provide screens and keyboards, while others provide
just a few buttons. These factors combine to create a confusing set of interac-
tions to achieve even the simplest task, for example, adding a new device to the
network [42].
The need to coordinate with outside agencies . The domestic network
does not operate in isolation. It must connect to the wider Internet to fulfil its
role. This requires coordination with outside agencies, such as Internet service
providers. This issue complicates fault diagnosis with users often unsure whether
the fault is with their network, the Internet service provider, or the wider In-
ternet [85]. Poole et al. explore this issue further by looking at the interaction
between domestic users and technical phone support staff [67]. They found that
the technical properties of domestic networks and the physical structure of the
home can complicate remote support of domestic networks.
The division of labour . Domestic networks are not jointly managed by all
members of the household. Often a single person will take responsibility [38].
This person is often a family member, but could also be friends or neighbours
who are called-upon to act as external support when the domestic network breaks.
The prevalence of these “gurus” can be seen as evidence that domestic networks
are not usable by a large section of the population [45, 69].
The lack of planning . Enterprise networks are carefully planned and man-
aged to ensure smooth operation and flexible provisioning. Network planning and
provisioning is a profession, undertaken by trained teams. In contrast, domestic
network planning focuses on the location of new devices in the home, how not to
break the existing network, and reducing disruption to household routines [37].
While these have a resemblance to the activities of enterprise network planning
and provisioning they are fundamentally different. For example, new devices are
added to domestic networks in an ad-hoc fashion, located based on aesthetics,
and the arrangement of the domestic space.
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The need for security configuration . Correctly securing a network is a
challenge, even for trained professionals. Security threats come from a number of
sources and are constantly evolving. Most domestic users are untrained and do
not have the time to keep up-to-date with the latest security threats.
Furthermore, research into how untrained users handle security has shown
that they avoid security related decisions, due to a lack of knowledge [93], and
the belief that others, for example, banks, software companies, and Internet ser-
vice providers will manage security on their behalf [27] . However, when they
do make choices, most rely on incomplete mental models, that can lead to inac-
curate decisions being made [93]. These factors have been associated with poor
Wi-Fi security practices [42], and the spread of malware and viruses [93]. Var-
ious approaches have been explored in an attempt to address this, for example,
outsourcing home network security [32].
The invisibility of the infrastructure . Edwards et al. define infrastructure
as:
“a broad term that can be applied to any system, organizational struc-
ture, or physical facility that supports an organization or society in
general; this broad term has been used to describe interconnect sys-
tems that sink into the background of everyday life (e.g., roads, sewers,
or telecommunications networks)” [31]
The domestic network infrastructure supports us in our everyday lives and
is often practically invisible to the end user, never revealing its true complexity.
This invisibility leads to complacency on the part of the user, and an expectation
that the system will “just work”. For example, the last time you turned on the
tap did you consider the vast network of pipes, pumps and treatment plants that
allow clean water to be delivered to your home?
The invisibility of the infrastructure and the fact that it mostly “just works”,
breeds complacency amongst users. This complacency causes poor documenta-
tion of the systems already deployed [31]. This, combined with the division of
labour, makes trouble shooting, adding new devices, and changing the configura-
tion to enable new services, a daunting task for most users.
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This poor understanding is brought to the forefront when the infrastructure
fails. Only then does the complexity of the system reveal itself. It is at this point
the users realise they do not have the knowledge to fix it themselves. This is all
to evident in the home network, when that important email must be sent, but for
some reason all the users gets is an incomprehensible error message. This lack of
expert knowledge is only part of the problem.
Another place where the invisibility of the infrastructure impacts on the us-
ability of the domestic network infrastructure is in network policy creation and
enforcement. Domestic network policy enterprise policies are prospective, de-
signed to stop a defined set of undesirable actions. Domestic network policies
are retrospective and situated within the moral ordering of domestic life [26].
Furthermore, the domestic network is influenced by the relationships of the oc-
cupants within the household, who create locally negotiated norms and expected
behaviours around network usage and the use of devices connected to it [89].
Enforcing locally negotiated rules requires an understanding of the network in-
frastructure and what is happening on it. However, currently available domestic
networking tools do not support this hindering the process [38, 88]. This is re-
ferred to as the Legibility problem.
The next section explores the current thinking on how best to address usability
problems within domestic networks.
2.4 Addressing the challenges
The empirical studies discussed above show that currently deployed domestic net-
works do not fit the domestic context. This mismatch between the technology
and the social aspects of domestic environments leads too many of its usability
problems. Early attempts at addressing this problem focused on technical solu-
tions. New protocols like Simple Service Discovery (SSDP) used by UPnP [56],
and Zeroconf [83] were developed. These focus on making the configuration pro-
cess automatic, without user involvement. UPnP and ZeroConf only address a
limited subset of domestic network configuration problems [95], and have been
criticised for weakening network security [39].
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Recently a new direction has emerged, which focuses on addressing the invisi-
bility of the infrastructure, sometimes called the infrastructure problem. Edwards
et al. highlight three facets of the infrastructure problem [31]. First, constrained
possibilities that they define as design choices in the infrastructure that may con-
strain desirable user experience outcomes. Second, interjected abstractions, where
complex aspects of the technical implementation are present in the user interface.
Finally, un-mediated interaction where physical interaction with the infrastruc-
ture is required to achieve the users’ goal. They argue that these three emergent
properties of current domestic networking infrastructure hinder the creation of
more user friendly domestic networks.
The constrained possibilities highlighted by Edwards et al. have led the HCI
community to rethink how and where HCI practitioners should be involved in the
design of the domestic network infrastructure. Edwards suggests that the HCI
community needs to be involved provocatively with the creation of the technical
infrastructure supporting domestic networks [31].
Recently some members of the HCI community have started to explore how
and where the infrastructure can be augmented to improve usability. Sventek et
al. have created a new router platform (Homework) that includes an “information
plane” [86]. The information plane they describe collects data on the operation of
the router and the traffic going through it, for example, DHCP leases, IP Flows
and RSSI information. The primary goal of the information plane is to collect
and store network activity to enable a variety of new systems and services to be
explored in the home.
Mortier et al. build on top of the Homework platform and explore putting
user interaction into the infrastructure [63]. They explore two strategies. First,
putting people in the protocol, which they illustrate through the modification of
the DHCP protocol to require user interaction to confirm the device requesting
an IP address is allowed to access the network. Second, bringing services closer
to users, which they demonstrate by modifying the DNS protocol to allow or
deny name resolution for particular sites for particular devices. A calendar based
interface was then created to leverage this new functionality. This platform was
then deployed in 12 households for a three month period. The “in the wild”
deployment led to four observations:
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• The invisible nature of a mundane infrastructure. Over time the
systems passive displays became just another part of the invisible infras-
tructure, ignored by the users unless a specific need arose or notification
was raised.
• Increasing network information increases social discord. Increased
visibility of network activity caused several tense conversations around
bandwidth sharing.
• The challenge of privacy. Making previously hidden network activity
available in an archive accessible through the system exposes new possible
sensitive data to the rest of the household.
• Managing the network is managing the household. New function-
alities added to the system related to controlling or limiting access to the
network have social implications and are subject to domestic judgements.
What activity is most important and who has access is all related to the
relationships between the occupants.
The work of Sventek and Mortier shows that by altering the underlying do-
mestic network infrastructure, the creation of interesting new features that are of
benefit to domestic users is possible.
It is upon the work above that this dissertation wishes to build. This work
takes a user-centred approach to redesigning domestic network infrastructure to
create user-centred solutions specifically for domestic networks. It can be seen
from Section 2.3 that there are many problems. Addressing them all would be
impractical. Therefore, two will be selected to explore in detail.
The first challenge explored is the simple act of adding devices to a Wi-Fi
network, more formally known as secure device association. This is an act of
securely introducing a new device to another device, over a wireless communica-
tion medium, without access to a public key infrastructure or trusted third party.
In the case of domestic networking, this could be the addition of a new device
to an existing wireless access point. This security-critical interaction with the
infrastructure has been shown to be a point of frustration for domestic network
users [42].
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The second problem addressed is the legibility problem. This has been high-
lighted by recent observational studies of domestic networks. A number of socio-
technical strategies for management and control of domestic networks have been
observed “in the wild” [24]. However, this type of socially mediated network
policy is not well supported by currently deployed domestic networking infras-
tructure.
These two challenges have been explored to varying degrees in the academic
literature. The next two sections explore these problems and the related academic
work in more detail. First, secure device association is reviewed before moving
on to domestic network legibility.
2.5 Wi-Fi device association
To explore the issues related to Wi-Fi device association an overview of currently
deployed technologies is presented before looking at the academic research. There
are several currently deployed methods for securely associating a Wi-Fi device to
a Wi-Fi network. Wi-Fi security is described in the 802.11i standard commonly
called WPA2 [4]. Several older standards exist and have been superseded by
WPA2 recently. WPA2 supports several methods of Wi-Fi device association
that have gained widespread adoption in consumer access points. These are
described in the following paragraphs.
Manual passphrase entry is the most commonly used method of associat-
ing a new devices to a Wi-Fi network, and is implemented by most devices as a
fall-back from other methods. The system takes advantage of a shared secret that
the user associating a device to the network must know. In the case of WPA2
this takes the form of an alphanumeric passphrase (formally, the Pairwise Master
Key, PMK) combined with the network name (formally, the Service Set Identifier,
SSID): if the user knows both, then they can add the device to the network. The
SSID is usually broadcast in the clear, with most devices allowing the user to
select it from a list. The network’s passphrase is often preconfigured and printed
on the bottom of the Access Point (AP) or chosen by the user when they initially
configure the AP. When the user provides the SSID and passphrase, the Ex-
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tensible Authentication Protocol exchange sets up an encrypted communication
channel between the device and AP.
Wi-Fi protected setup (WPS) is a standard from the Wi-Fi Alliance ad-
dressing usability issues with manual configuration of Wi-Fi networks [5]. It
offers users a standard way to setup security protected Wi-Fi networks, removing
the need for manual configuration. WPS offers three methods of configuration.
First, in-band configuration that requires users to begin the pairing process by
manually entering a 4 or 8 digit PIN into the device being added. This method
requires only knowledge of the PIN and the device to be in range of the AP to
enable successful pairing. The PIN can be static (printed on the AP and used
for all association attempts) or temporary (used once per association attempt).
Second, Out-of-Band (OOB) configuration that uses RFID or NFC tokens to pass
keys between the device and the network. This method is not yet implemented
in consumer hardware, and so it is not described further. Finally, push button
configuration (PBC) provides a simple method to enable unauthenticated key
exchange between the device and the network. The user starts the process by
conditioning the device (various methods are used, but commonly they simply se-
lect the desired network from a list) and then conditioning the AP by pushing the
WPS button. The AP will listen for a connection attempt for 120 seconds before
timing out. If the connection attempt is successful Diffie-Hellman key exchange
is used to create an encrypted channel over which the passphrase is exchanged,
enabling subsequent communication to be encrypted via normal methods [57].
Unfortunately there are several problems with the currently deployed meth-
ods. The multiple step, many device, acronym filled setup experience involved in
configuring a secure Wi-Fi network has been suggested as the root cause of many
inexperienced users leaving their networks partially or completely unsecured. Ho
and Dearman suggest, this is either due to lack of user understanding or simply
the burden of the complex interaction [42].
Issues of passphrase memorability, confusion, incorrect recall and input er-
ror also affect the usability of manual passphrase entry that can be frustrating
for users [75]. Manual passphrase entry methods are further complicated in do-
mestic environments by the limited interaction capabilities of, and inconsistent
implementation between, devices.
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There are also considerable problems with WPS. Current implementations of
in-band WPS are vulnerable to brute force attacks on the PIN [91]. Also, push
button methods rely on physical access to both the device and the AP that can
pose problems if either the device is not very mobile (e.g., a TV or refrigerator)
or, as is increasingly common, the AP is hidden away and not easily accessible.
The problems with currently deployed device association methods highlights
several areas where these technologies are a poor fit for domestic environments.
First, the heterogeneity of the devices deployed in the home leads to an inconsis-
tent implementation of the protocols. Second, the currently deployed protocols
do not take into account the physical arrangement of domestic network, causing
frustration. It is these challenges that this dissertation addresses. This is not
the first work to present a solution to securely associating devices with domestic
networks. Next, a review of device pairing mechanisms studied by the academic
community is presented.
Academic research into securely associating a device with a home network is
a particular case of the general problem of securely pairing two devices. This
has been extensively studied by the usable security (HCIsec) community. It was
first addressed by the “Resurrecting Duckling” protocol [82] which suggests that
devices should be connected by a physical connection such as a cable for the
pairing process to occur. “Talking to strangers” [8] takes a similar approach,
but uses an infrared connection as the out-of-band channel to transfer credentials
between devices. Both need little user involvement, but do require that the
devices have a compatible hardware interface, which is often not the case in
today’s complex device ecosystem.
Numerous other projects have approached this problem through the use of
out-of-band channels and user involvement. “Seeing is believing” (SiB) [55] in-
troduces visual out-of-band channels for mutual authentication of two camera-
equipped wireless devices, using 2D barcodes to explore the general problem
of bootstrapping encrypted communication between mobile devices and access
points. Blinking Lights [77] simplifies this to requiring only a unidirectional vi-
sual out-of-band channel to mutually authenticate devices. A single flashing LED
on one device and the camera on the second device enable transfer of the short
authentication code. Shake Well Before Use, attempts to address secure device
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pairing for devices with limited input capability, using a novel interaction where
both devices are shaken together by the user to generate a shared secret for the
establishment of a secure wireless connection [54].
“Network-in-a-Box: How to Set Up a Secure Wireless Network in Under a
Minute” [7] uses location-limited channels to perform the out-of-band key ex-
change in an attempt to address the usability issues of the pairing problem.
These location-limited channels usually have lower bandwidth and higher latency
than normal network communication mediums. Their implementation uses short-
range infra-red to provide an intuitive point-to-authenticate gesture for out-of-
band public key exchange, bootstrapping the wireless joining process. Similar ap-
proaches using different out-of-band channels have been suggested, such as, “Loud
and clear” [34] and HAPADEP [81]: both use auditory channels for credential
exchange. For a detailed review of other methods see [47, 49].
Each of these approaches reduces the burden on the user, but places consider-
able constraints on the hardware and/or software capabilities available on the AP
and, worse, on the joining devices. For example, SiB and Blinking Lights require
all devices to have a camera to read the network credentials, while Network-in-
a-Box requires that devices and AP have an IR sender and receiver respectively.
Such requirements are often impractical for low-cost single function devices like
sensors and media streamers, due to the increased manufacturing costs. They
can also rarely be met by the devices already deployed in the home, making
backwards compatibility difficult to achieve. It is these practical limitations that
have prevented adoption of the techniques suggested in the literature. However,
there is a clear benefit to using OOB channels to reduce the burden on users
streamlining the user interaction. Our work in this area attempts to exploit the
benefits of OOB channels without imposing unrealistic hardware and software
constraints and maintaining backwards compatibility.
2.6 Legibility of domestic networks
The challenge of network legibility is first highlighted by Brundell et al. in [18].
They point out that to support domestic users in the negotiation of network
policy, users need to understand what is happening on their networks, and that
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currently available networking tools do not provide this level of accountability and
transparency. They also show a dichotomy between the enterprise and domestic
views of network traffic.
Existing work on network data visualisation has shown that surfacing hidden
data, such as bandwidth usage [20], can help the users develop a better under-
standing of the network. The visualisation of network data has also been shown
to support negotiation of fair use of bandwidth. The body of work in this area so
far has focused on the use of web interfaces and situated displays to engage the
user with their data [95, 96], but is limited to displaying network configuration,
devices connected and bandwidth usage. They provide little or no visibility on
what is actually happening on the network, beyond device X is using 10% of the
available bandwidth. While this information is useful for real time fault diagnosis
it is far from comprehensive. No information is provided to enable users to see
what a device is doing or who is doing it.
Domestic data annotation has generated some recent research interest in the
field of domestic energy usage [22, 74]. Of particular interest is the recent work
undertaken by Costanza et. al., as it has some similarities to our work [22].
Although the target data source is different, Costanza’s main goal is to “allow
users to engage with and understand their energy consumption data”. This is
achieved using an interactive visualisation of live and historical energy data with
user contributed annotations. The goal was to help people link their activities to
their energy consumption. In this work energy consumption visualised is through
occupant activities rather then just appliance readings. There were three key
findings. First, time-series historical visualisation provided much more informa-
tion than the traditional instantaneous monitoring of devices. Second, interactive
visualisation and annotation can help uses relate complex data to their everyday
lives through activities. Third, the link between activities and usage data helps
people understand how their actions impact energy usage.
Bates and Broadbent have also presented a position paper that suggests com-
bining network data and energy data with an annotation platform to better un-
derstand activities, users and energy usage [10].
Enterprise network traffic classification has many uses in accounting, planning,
provisioning, quality of service, and detection of malicious activity. Consequently,
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it has been the focus of a large body of research and has been shown to be a
difficult task. This body of work has highlighted many challenges and presented
a number of approaches to address them. This section will provide an overview of
core network classification techniques with a view to how they might be applicable
to the domestic environment.
Early attempts at traffic classification relied solely on the use of well known
port numbers. These are managed by The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) in the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry [23].
Ports were assigned to applications on a first-come-first-served basis. Port num-
bers are between 0 and 65535 and are split into three distinct ranges: 0 to 1023
are system ports, 1024 to 49151 are user ports and 49152 to 65535 are the dy-
namic ports. The correct usage of these ranges has been specified [23]. Only the
system ports and the user ports are registered with the IANA. The first network
monitoring solutions relied on this set of agreed ports to determine the types of
traffic passing through a network [61]. While this approach was successful for a
while it eventually started to fail for two reasons. First, new protocols were en-
capsulated in other protocols, for example, HTTP. Second, use of port numbers is
only a convention and cannot be enforced. Therefore, applications are often run
“off port” to avoid firewall restrictions or to hide malicious activity. This prob-
lem was quantified by Moore and Papagiannaki [61]. They showed port based
methods could only correctly classify 69% of application flows in their dataset.
To address the limitation of port based approaches packet payload inspection or
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) techniques were developed.
DPI relies on the capture and analysis of the full IP packet and its payload. It
provides greater accuracy and is available in a number of commercial applications
e.g Ellacoya 1 and Packeteer 2. However, it has a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it
is very resource intensive and does not scale well to high bandwidth. Second, it is
reliant on hand crafted application signatures to enable pattern matching within
the payloads. Maintaining and creating these adds a significant staffing overhead.
Finally, DPI is not effective if the traffic is encrypted. These drawbacks forced
1http://www.ellacoya.com
2http://www.packeteer.com
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researchers to examine new techniques, namely, host behaviour and statistical
fingerprinting.
Host behaviour based techniques examine the “social interaction” between
hosts on the network, and look for tell-tale communication patterns. The first
work to explore this area was Blinc [44]. They classified flows captured on several
enterprise networks into eleven broad categories (web, p2p, data, Network man-
agement, mail, news, chat/irc, streaming, gaming, Non Payload and Unknown)
with an accuracy of 80%-90%.
The limitations of port based methods, deep packet inspection and the require-
ment for greater accuracy led researchers to explore the use of statistical methods
to classify network traffic. The use of Bayesian analysis or machine learning tech-
niques was first proposed by Moore and Zues in 2005 [62]. Moore and Zues used a
Naive Bayes classifier to assign traffic to ten classes: bulk, database, interactive,
mail, services, www, P2P, attack, games and multimedia.
They used the properties available in the IP Flow records and IP packet
headers as input data to their Bayesian classifier. IP flow records are defined as a
tuple containing source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destina-
tion port, protocol number, duration, number of packets and bytes transferred.
IP packets were grouped into flows using the IP five tuple as a unique key. The
flows were then hand classified to provide ground truth for the learning algo-
rithm. The applications (or protocols) were grouped into classes based on their
“potential requirements from the network infrastructure” [62].
For these techniques to be effective in the domestic environment to overcome
the lack transparency and accountability the classes must be of use to domestic
users. The goal of this dissertation is to facilitate the local negotiation and mon-
itoring of network policies, enabling self-management by users. These policies
are often based around the user of a device performing particular activities [18].
Hence, the classification system should group traffic based around users and ac-
tivities. User identification from network traffic has received much attention from
a security and privacy perspective. Next, the academic literature relating to user
identification is discussed before moving on to network activity recognition.
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User Identification using network data. Our work aims to identify which
user is using a device connected to the a domestic network within a household.
This means the task is to identify a small set of users for whom a large amount
of data is available. Hence, this is not a traditional identification problem where
we need a single feature that is as close as possible, unique to a user, within a
large population e.g. a fingerprint. What we are looking for are the characteristic
patterns generated by user activity, which end hosts they visit, how often, and
what are the properties of the generated flows. This behavioural approach has
been examined by a number of authors concerned with the re-identification of
users from various networking related data sources.
Herrmann et al. examine the feasibility of re-identifying users for a passive
attacker monitoring DNS requests [41]. They use a dataset collected over two
months containing the DNS records for more than 3600 users from the student
living accommodation at their university. Herrmann et al. make an assumption
that a single IP address in the dataset is linked to one user, which is valid as each
user is assigned a static IP for their room. However, they note that there will be
some noise present in the data due to students visiting friends and using a device
they do not own. They build profiles for each user over a 24 hour period and test
several classifiers and filtering techniques (sub-linear transform, normalisation,
inverse document frequency).
Their best reported classifier is able to re-identify 85.4% of DNS requests to
users. Herrmann also discusses the effects of some of the parameters in the model.
Firstly, they show that the length of time the profile is built over has a signif-
icant impact on accuracy with longer time windows provided better accuracy.
Second, they also notice the presence of a large number of DNS queries related
to non-human activity (various checkers, software updates, e.t.c) in their dataset.
Herrmann made an effort to manually filter out non-human activity and found
it reduced the accuracy of their best classifier to 79.5%. This suggests that the
behaviour of the host is an important source of noise in the of task of identifying
users identification.
Another related body of work on user identification can be found in the data
mining and information retrieval communities, where users are profiled from the
data in web server log files, to enable personalisation and fraud detection. In some
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work in this area profiling is extended to enable behaviour based user identifica-
tion from web server log data [97]. In his work Yang develop their own profiling
method, that extracts many behaviour profiles per user, then selects the most
distinct profiles to be used in the identification phase. Yang’s method achieves
62% to 87% accuracy depending on the number of training sessions for a web
server with 100 concurrent users.
Flow based behavioural profiling has also been attempted in “User Profiling
and Re-identification” [50]. Kumpovst and Matyvs focus on re-identifying users
on a University network for three protocols (HTTP, HTTPS and SSH) using
behaviour profiles generated from historical traffic logs. Their dataset is a full
set of flow records collected from Masaryk University network, but they do not
state how many users, hosts and flows they collected or the time period it covers.
They use a section of their dataset as a training set and derive a “vector of
source IP address behaviour” aggregated over a 1 month time window. The
vector of source IP address behaviour is then compared using cosine similarity
measure weighted using inverse document frequency to the new vector of source
IP address behaviour generated from the second section of the dataset. They
report false positive rates of 67.9%, 59.8% and 21.3% for HTTP, HTTPS and
SSH traffic respectively, giving true positive rates of 32.1%, 40.2% and 78.7%.
There is no mention of how the authors linked the hosts to users, there seems to
be an explicit assumption that a single host is only ever used by a single user and
that hosts never change IP address. These may be valid assumptions for their
dataset. However, they do not necessarily hold for domestic networks.
Now that we have reviewed the related literature the next chapter presents
an exploration of user-centred mechanisms for infrastructure control. It begins
by presenting the design of MultiNet, a system for Wi-Fi device association in
domestic environments, before moving on to its evaluation, in terms of its per-
formance and usability.
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Chapter 3
User-centred mechanisms for
domestic network infrastructure
control
This chapter focuses on improving domestic network infrastructure control, in
particular the task of Wi-Fi device association. As outlined in the background
(see Section 2.5) currently deployed methods for Wi-Fi device association are
not fit for purpose in domestic environments. The current situation is likely to
be worsened by the recent trend towards the Internet Of Things (IoT), where
devices are normally single function, network connected, with limited interaction
capabilities.
To address the issues surrounding Wi-Fi device association, a user-centred
design approach is adopted to create a user-centred mechanism for Wi-Fi de-
vice association designed specifically for domestic environments, called MultiNet.
MultiNet provides a lightweight consistent interaction to securely associate de-
vices with domestic wireless networks.
MultiNet is designed focusing on the needs of domestic users and the affor-
dances of the domestic environment. MultiNet is used to explore the trade off
between usability and performance in a domestic setting. Its design deliberately
compromises network performance to improve the user experience. MultiNet
substantially changes the device association process by inverting the credential
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flow and creating one Wi-Fi network per device. Instead of configuring each
device to one pre-configured network. MultiNet also takes advantage of an Out-
of-Band communication channel, implemented using a third device, the Network
Controller.
Before the final design of MultiNet is described, the process used to created
it is presented. Firstly, a list of design parameters is drawn from an analysis
of the literature and the domestic context. Second, the design of MultiNet is
presented, paying special attention to how the design principles have been adhered
to. Finally, the results of a network performance and usability evaluation are
presented to compare MultiNet to existing Wi-Fi device association methods and
explore the trade off between usability and performance.
3.1 MultiNet design
The design parameters of MultiNet are drawn from an analysis of the domestic
context, domestic users, and academic literature. This leads to ten design pa-
rameters, to which the new system should conform. The goal is to design an
interactionally lightweight and secure device association mechanism for domestic
environments.
From the literature four accepted usability problems with Wi-Fi device as-
sociation are exposed. Firstly, passphrases are difficult to remember and enter
on some interface constrained devices. Second, inconsistent implementation of
association methods causes usability issues, due to the differing interaction styles
for each device. Third, splitting the interaction between the device and the access
point, as in WPS push-button, is problematic for devices located in different ar-
eas of the home. Finally, users often do not understand the security implications
of their actions. For example, choosing week passphrases or disabling WPA2 to
support an old device. This is due to the complexity of the underlying infras-
tructure and complex security model, combined with the need for users to make
important security related choices. From these issues five design parameters were
drawn:
DP1 The transfer of credentials should be automatic.
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DP2 The interaction should be consistent for all devices irrespective of its inter-
actional capability.
DP3 The interaction should be located in a single location, at the device or the
access point.
DP4 The security model should be simple, limiting attack vectors to ones which
users understand.
DP5 The security related choices should be minimised.
From the HCIsec literature we can see that there are clear benefits in us-
ing location limited out-of-band communication channels for credential transfer.
However, out-of-band communication channels place unrealistic constraints on
the devices and infrastructure. This leads to the following design principle.
DP6 The interaction should not require that devices have particular hardware
to perform credential exchange.
From the literature concerning the socio-technical aspects of domestic net-
works a number of factors that affect our design choices are found. Domestic
networks are usually built in an ad-hoc fashion, with new devices added from
many manufacturers to perform a variety of functions. This piecemeal construc-
tion means that it is unlikely that a user will replace all their devices at the
same time. Therefore, backwards compatibility with existing devices must be
preserved. Current Wi-Fi association methods provide poor support for access
revocation. Access revocation is important in domestic environments in a number
of scenarios, for example, visitation or sale of a device. From these the following
three design parameters are drawn.
DP7 Modification of the software on existing devices is not possible.
DP8 Modification of the hardware on existing devices is not possible.
DP9 Revocation of access should supported and have a lightweight interaction.
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We also made a number of observations about how users manage security
of the home more generally. Firstly, the home is a private space with access
negotiated with the occupants. Second, the security of the items in the home is
controlled by controlling physical access to private spaces using locked doors and
cupboards, for example. The control of physical access and the securing of the
boundaries of the home are common and well understood practices that people
do automatically every day. This suggests the design parameter below.
DP10 The system should utilise the inherent physical security of the home and
existing social conventions around access to the dwelling.
The next section describes the final implementation of MultiNet. Each piece
of the system is discussed and the impact of the above design parameters is
highlighted.
3.2 MultiNet implementation
MultiNet aims to address the usability issues of associating Wi-Fi devices in do-
mestic environments. It has two key features which make it significantly different
to current approaches. Firstly, the way in which the 802.11-2004 protocol is de-
ployed is inverted. This means that the direction of credential transfer is reversed.
Devices are preconfigured to associate with a specific network and the access point
can be configured to offer this network enabling the device to connect, rather than
configuring each device to a single network offered by the access point as is cur-
rently the case. This reversal creates one network per device, leading to multiple
Wi-Fi networks, hence its name.
Second, an intermediary device, the Network Controller is introduced into the
association process. The Network Controller acts as an interface to the network
and provides the extra hardware required to perform credential exchange, over
an out-of-band communication channel, between the access point and the device
being associated, meeting DP1. The Network Controller allows the use of an
out-of-band communication channel without placing hardware and software con-
straints on the devices joining the network, fulfilling DP6, DP7 and DP8. The
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Network Controller also provides a single point of interaction with the network
satisfying DP2 and DP3.
These two changes fundamentally alter the device association interaction and
require modification of the underlying network infrastructure. Next, the modifi-
cation required to implement MultiNet are discussed.
Modifying the access point software. The software running on the access
point is modified to enable the creation of on-demand virtual access points for
each device. Each virtual access point uses a different set of WPA2 credentials.
These are provided by the device, through the Network Controller. An over view
of MultiNet’s implementation is provided in Figure 3.1.
The hostapd user-space daemon is used to provide wireless access point and
wireless authentication functionality conforming to the IEEE 802.11i WPA2 spec-
ification. Hostapd is mature open-source software and is commonly deployed in
many commercial access point implementations. MultiNet requires that Hostapd
is modified to enable dynamic creation and destruction of networks secured via
the WPA2 protocol. The modifications made pre-allocate memory for state in-
formation, for example, WPA2 configuration and corresponding virtual network
interfaces, for a maximum of 50 networks.
Upon creation of a new network, the associated virtual network interface
is connected to a standard Linux layer 2 bridge (br0 ) to enable communication
with other devices connected to the access point. The bridge interconnects all the
per-device virtual networks, so IP traffic can propagate between all devices (the
administration network for the Network Controller is excluded from the bridge
to maintain isolation). Finally, the configuration re-load routines were modified
to only de-authenticate stations when the SSID or passphrase of a network is
changed or removed from the hostapd configuration file. The configuration file
is re-read whenever hostapd receives a SIGHUP, issued each time a new virtual
access point is configured or removed.
MultiNet exposes its new functionality to the Network Controller via a set of
RESTful web services. These are only accessible over HTTPS using the WPA2-
secured administrative network configured on the Network Controller. Each net-
work created is presented as a distinct virtual interface joined to the global bridge
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Figure 3.1: Overview of MultiNet implementation.
Figure 3.2: MultiNet Network Controller interface.
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and routed to the outgoing upstream network interface. The Network Controller’s
administration network is not added to the bridge or routed upstream, isolating
it. This protects administration functions from non-trusted devices connected
to the access point. Consequently, the Network Controller only uses the admin-
istration network when the MultiNet configuration application is running. The
normal network connectivity is provided by a standard device specific network.
Implementing the Network Controller. The Network Controller is con-
nected to the access point via a dedicated WPA2-secured administrative network
between the Network Controller and the access point. This arrangement enables
a consistent configuration interaction to be used across all devices without impos-
ing new hardware or software constraints, maintaining backwards compatibility
with legacy equipment, fulfilling DP7 and DP8.
The current implementation of MultiNet uses a consumer smartphone as the
Network Controller, with its built-in camera providing the visual out-of-band
channel. The out-of-band channel is created using a QR Code affixed to the ex-
terior of the associating device which has the required credentials for the WPA2
network encoded. Backwards compatibility requires no software or hardware
modification. The device must simply be configured with an SSID and passphrase
which are then affixed to its surface as a QR Code. The credentials can then be
securely transmitted to the access point via the Network Controller’s adminis-
tration network. The access point then creates a virtual access point with the
provided credentials and the new device can automatically associate to the new
network. The overall protocol flow is depicted in Figure 3.3. The end result is
that the access point provides many networks, roughly one per device.
The Network Controller is implemented as an application for an Android
smartphone. When it is active, it attempts to join the administrative network.
On success, it provides a list of active configured networks and a button to add
new device to the network. The Network Controller provides feedback to the
user when a device is added successfully. The interface shown in Figure 3.2 has
been kept simple, intentionally, to avoid confusion. Credential exchange takes
place over an out-of-band channel provided by the, Network Controller, and the
hardware requirements for the out-of-band channel are abstracted to it. This
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arrangement places no constraints on the hardware or software of the devices on
the network beyond that already required, fulfilling DP7 and DP8.
The Network Controller is a fundamental part of MultiNet. It provides several
benefits in the device association process. Firstly, it moves the configuration task
from the device being added, to the Network Controller. This overcomes the
limited interaction capability of a number of devices found in the home, such as
games consoles and smart fridges.
Second, the Network Controller itself can be an interactionally rich device
with a touch screen, microphone, fingerprint sensor or camera, or whatever is
required. This enables the creation of new otherwise impractical interactions for
device association, which can be crafted to fit the needs of the domestic user.
Third, it provides a centralised point of control for the network. Reducing the
need for hard to find web interfaces. Fourth, the Network Controller is mobile.
Its mobility enables the configuration to be carried out at the location where the
device is being installed, which is important for large and/or distant devices. The
interaction in WPS is often criticised for it dislocated interaction.
These four factors combined make it possible to build new interactions that
take place in a single location, with a consistent interaction, which meets DP2
and DP3.
This implementation of MultiNet reuses a common smartphone. This device
was chosen as they are widely available, have Wi-Fi and cameras, and can be
re-purposed easily through the installation of Apps. However, the inclusion of
a dedicated device for this purpose is also possible. For example, the router
manufacturer could bundle a dedicated Network Controller pre-installed with
the MultiNet software and pre-configured to use the administration network.
Bootstrapping the Network Controller. Before MultiNet can be used it is
required that a Network Controller is securely associated with the administration
network. This step is crucial as it establishes a trusted signalling channel over
which other devices can be introduced. This only needs to be done once per
Network Controller. Any WPA2 compliant device with a camera and the ability
to install Apps can be used as the Network Controller. Most modern smartphones
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Figure 3.3: MultiNet interactions to add a device [16].
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and tablets are a good fit for these criteria and they provide a low cost, convenient
and incrementally deployable solution which is readily available in many homes.
The process of setting up the Network Controller is straightforward and has
two steps. The access point is required to have two QR Codes affixed to its
surface. One contains the install location of the Network Controller application.
The other contains the credentials for the secure administrative network. Step
one is to point a standard QR Code reader application running on the device the
user wishes to use as the Network Controller at the first QR Code. This causes
the user’s device to be taken to a website where the controller application can
be downloaded and installed just like any other application. Step two is to run
the application and point the device’s camera at the second QR Code containing
the administration network credentials. The Network Controller application can
then join the pre-configured administrative network on the router. This process
securely associates the new Network Controller with the access point.
Device Pre-Configuration. MultiNet requires that devices are pre-configured
with a unique SSID and passphrase. How this is achieved is an important ques-
tion. Ideally, we envisage that all devices are pre-configured by the manufacturer
before they are shipped to distributors. This would require minor changes to
the manufacturing process as many devices already have serial numbers, MAC
addresses and other information placed in their firmware at manufacture time.
However, this is an unlikely scenario in the near future, as it would require large
scale adoption before such changes would make commercial sense.
Thankfully, this is not the only option for pre-configuration of devices. Multi-
Net enables the configuration process for new devices to be outsourced. Out-
sourcing, where others (e.g, relatives, professionals or retailers) undertake the
technical aspects of device management has been suggested in [68]. Device pre-
configuration could easily be outsourced, resulting in a printed stick-on QR Code
being affixed to the device at the time of purchase or by a professional network
engineer. This approach negates the need for local configuration of network cre-
dentials.
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Figure 3.4: Laptop client device with MultiNet QR Code encoded credentials.
Credential Encoding. Credentials are encoded in QR Codes that facilitate
MultiNet’s simple scan and connect interaction mechanism. QR Codes were cho-
sen for five main reasons. Firstly, they are easily machine readable, a fundamental
requirement to remove the need to manually enter the configuration information.
Second, they have a simple and fast point and capture interaction method that
fits well with the goal of making the process quick and interactionally lightweight.
Third, there is a degree of user familiarity with them, as they are commonly de-
ployed in commercial situations. Fourth, they are resilient to wear and tear and
have built in error correction. Finally, QR Codes can encode sufficient informa-
tion for credential storage. They must be able to encode a unique credential
(SSID and passphrase) for every networked device manufactured. The maximum
length of an SSID is 25 bytes, and the maximum length WPA2 passphrase is
75 bytes, giving 100 bytes allowing ample credentials to be generated in combina-
tion. Figure 3.4 shows a MultiNet QR Code attached to a device in a suggested
location.
Adding Devices. Associating a new device to the network is the primary goal
of MultiNet and is straightforward, assuming the device being added has been per-
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configured as described above. To add a new device the configuration application
is opened on the Network Controller and the “add device” button is pressed. This
activates the camera and starts scanning for QR codes. The Network Controller
is then pointed at the QR Code on the new device. The Network Controller
then decodes the QR Code and extracts the credentials. The credentials are then
sent to the router over the administration network and are used to configure the
virtual access point for the new device. At this point a new network has been
created with the appropriate SSID and passphrase, and the Network Controller
displays a success indication to the user. The new device will then associate
with the newly created network as soon as networking is enabled. This process
is shown in (Figure 3.3)
Removing Devices. From our analysis of the domestic context the removal of
devices from the network was one feature that current systems cannot support
easily. It is important in two domestic scenarios: providing temporary access to
visitors and removing a device for resale or gifting. The Network Controller of
MultiNet acts as a user interface to the network which makes this task relatively
easy.
The Network Controller shows a list of configured devices that have networks
configured as shown in Figure 3.2. Revoking access for a device is simple: a
user simply selects the device from the list and chooses “remove”. The Network
Controller then communicates with the MultiNet access point over the secure
signalling channel, and the relevant network is removed.
Once the network has been removed the pre-configured device can no longer
access its network using its stored credentials, effectively revoking its access to the
network. This fully satisfies DP9. In the currently deployed system all devices
share the same credentials, to remove a device it must be manually de-configured,
or the network credentials must be changed and all remaining devices reconfig-
ured. Both of these methods are hampered by the limited interaction capabilities
of current devices.
Compatibility With Existing Devices. Backwards compatibility for legacy
devices is crucial in domestic environments as many homes already have an ex-
42
tensive Wi-Fi deployment and home owners are unlikely to want to replace all
their existing devices. Backwards compatibility is achieved by the home owner
using the Network Controller to generate a QR Code with a unique SSID and
passphrase. The legacy device can then be manually configured to this SSID and
passphrase, and the generated QR Code printed out and affixed to it.
This process need only be done once per-device and once initial configuration is
complete, the legacy device will behave the same as any other MultiNet-enabled
device. This functionality enables new deployment and service models to be
explored, allowing the creation of outsourced configuration models described by
Shehan and Edwards [80]. Manufacturers, retail outlets and network professionals
could offer new configuration services, generating and printing configurations, and
affixing them to the device for later use by the device owner.
Security considerations. Users are known to have limited understanding of
the security issues surrounding Wi-Fi networks [46]. MultiNet aims to simplify
the security model through three aspects of its design: its use of a proximate
out-of-band channel, its use of QR Codes for credential storage, and its use of
per-device credentials (SSID and passphrase). We will deal with each in turn.
MultiNet uses a proximate out-of-band channel which provides three impor-
tant benefits. Firstly, it removes the burden of managing and entering secure
passphrases from the user and the devices. This allows the automatic generation
of credentials, which can be longer and use a wider range of characters than those
typically input manually due to mental and physical limitations. The generated
passphrases thus increase the search space for brute force attacks making them
impractical [87]. Using a proximate out-of-band channel in this way meets DP1
and DP5.
Second, Diffie-Hellman key exchange is no longer used to construct a secure
signalling channel over an insecure medium. Diffie-Hellman is used in existing
methods, for example, WPS and has been shown to be vulnerable to man-in-the-
middle attacks [51]. Finally, at no point is the network left in an insecure open
state. WPS PBC will allow any device to connect once the access point has been
conditioned. The user has no control over which device eventually connects [52].
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The use of QR Codes for credential storage has benefits and disadvantages.
The first benefit is that reading a QR code requires line-of-sight, reasonable prox-
imity, and the use of a camera to successfully capture a decodable image of the
MultiNet credentials. Carrying out this type of attack covertly can be difficult
and has a high chance of detection. For devices located within the home the
difficulty of this type of attack is increased by the standard security routines of
most homes, for example, locking doors and not allowing access to strangers.
This physical interaction style was chosen to implement DP10.
For mobile devices which leave the safety of the home other strategies can
be adopted to increase the physical security of the QR codes. For example:
QR Codes could be removable for secure storage, privacy covers could be added
requiring a flap to be lifted to expose the QR Code, or, on devices with screens,
transient codes could be displayed on screen when a physical button is pressed
or application is launched.
The proximate out-of-band channel implemented via QR codes creates an un-
ambiguous threat model for the Network Controller and devices: physical access
is required. This maps the wireless network’s security onto the physical security
of devices, something which users manage in their everyday lives. The physicality
of the association interaction, increased passphrase entropy and the security rou-
tines of the household provide sufficient protection against collocated and remote
attackers. MultiNet also has a number of other properties that are relevant to
the security of domestic networks.
The many network design of MultiNet requires that each device has its own
unique credentials. Per-device unique credentials enable temporary or permanent
revocation of network access, which can be useful in a number of domestic sce-
narios. For instance, visitation, punitive control or when a device is sold, lost
or stolen. Revoking access is simple and can be achieved by using the Network
Controller to delete the relevant network. Re-associating revoked access is iden-
tical to the usual association procedure. In the case of loss, theft, or compromise
of the Network Controller the access point must be reconfigured with credentials
for a new administrative network, which must be printed and attached to the ac-
cess point before configuring a new Network Controller using the bootstrapping
procedure described earlier.
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Finally, the lightweight interaction, in which the Network Controller’s inter-
face and device specific credentials enables the creation of new security policies,
impractical or impossible with existing mechanisms. For example, revoking ac-
cess after a set time period has elapsed, a period of absence, or a set number of
connections has been made.
MultiNet has now been fully described and a discussion of its main features
has been completed. The next section presents a lab based usability study of
MultiNet before moving on to an analysis of how the modifications have affected
the performance of the network.
3.3 MultiNet usability analysis
The primary objective of MultiNet is to improve the usability of domestic net-
work device associations, without compromising security. To ascertain whether
or not MultiNet provides enhanced usability over current methods, a compar-
ative usability study was undertaken. The study compares MultiNet to WPS
PBC, which was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, it is a standardised usability-
focused device association method. Secondly, it is widely sported by consumer
devices and has good market penetration [94]. The rest of this section describes
the study in detail and presents the results obtained. The study was conducted
in lab conditions with all participants performing the task of building a network
using both WPS and MultiNet. Participants performed each task in the same
lab with the same facilitator. Before the study a short pre-study survey was con-
ducted to assess exposure to home networking, WPS and QR Codes. After the
study was completed a post-study, semi-structured interview was used to capture
participants’ reactions to both systems.
3.3.1 Participants
Sixteen participants took part in the study, ten male and six female. Participants
were recruited from around the university campus using posters and mailing lists.
Participants were given a £10 Amazon voucher to compensate them for the in-
convenience of taking part in the study. Of the sixteen participants, ten indicated
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WPS QR Codes
Never 12 6
Occasionally 1 8
Often 3 2
Table 3.1: Prior exposure to WPS and QR Codes.
Age Group 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 >54
Participants 4 9 0 2 1
Table 3.2: User trial participant age range.
they were the person responsible for configuring their own home network. How-
ever, only three of the participants were very confident they would be able to
configure a new wireless-enabled device they had purchased. Twelve of the six-
teen participants had never used WPS before and six had never used QR Codes.
The networks of the participants were varied in size and complexity, with the
number of connected devices ranging from 3 to 15 with a mean of 5.6 (SD = 3.8).
Two of the sixteen participants were unable to provide detailed information on
the devices and configuration of their home networks. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give
more details on the composition of the participants.
3.3.2 Method
The user trial consisted of a single task to construct a network consisting of
three consumer devices. These were a HP Deskjet 3050A e-All-in-One Printer, a
Squeezebox Radio and a Samsung laptop running Windows 7. The study had two
conditions: C1, connecting the three devices using WPS PBC, and C2, connecting
the three devices using MultiNet. The order in which the subjects experienced the
two conditions was randomised to compensate for any carryover effect between
conditions. In each condition the devices were identical and added to the network
in the same order. We assumed that the MultiNet Network Controller had been
previously bootstrapped to the network as this step would be carried out at
network installation time, perhaps with the aid of the network service provider.
Participants received instructions on the use of the required features of the
router before the task began in both conditions. Following the manufacturer’s
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Connecting the HP DeskJet 350A Using WPS 
 
1. 
 
To start the process press the Wireless button   
2. 
 
Select 2. Wireless settings  
3. 
 
Select 2. Wi-Fi Protected Set Up (WPS)  
4. 
 
Select OK 
5. 
 
Select “Push Button” and follow the onscreen 
instructions. 
 
The device is connected when the blue Wi-Fi  light 
stops flashing   
 
 
 (a) WPS
Connecting the HP DeskJet 350A Multinet 
1. 
 
Device Name 
 
Locate the device QR-code  
2. 
 
On the satellite controller select “add new 
device”    
3. 
 
a) Align the QR-Code in the centre of the screen 
  
b) Hold the satellite controller still for a few 
seconds. 
 
 
c)  A beep will sound and you will be returned to 
the main screen 
4. 
 
Turn the printer on using the power button  
5.   
The device is connected when the blue Wi-Fi  
light stops flashing   
 
 (b) MultiNet
Figure 3.5: Instructions for adding the printer to the network for WPS (top) and
MultiNet (bottom).
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instructions for adding the printer, it took an experienced systems’ administrator
over 10 minutes to achieve a successful connection via WPS. Although more
concise, instructions for the other devices were still excessively complex. Thus,
to ensure consistency in the level of guidance provided, we rewrote instructions
for all devices in both conditions. Great care was taken to keep the level, style and
amount of instruction consistent between the two conditions. See Figures 3.5a
and 3.5b for examples of the instructions provided.
Immediately after experiencing each condition, participants were asked to
complete a System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire to gather their opinions
on the systems usability. The SUS [15] is a “quick‘n’dirty” usability evaluation
tool comprising 10 short Likert scale questions designed to quickly gather users’
opinions on system usability (effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction). It gener-
ates a score from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating greater usability.
To compare both systems directly, we use task completion time as a measure
of effectiveness, with lower times indicating greater effectiveness. We measured
the time taken to complete each step in configuring the device as participants
moved through the task under each condition. Timing started when the partici-
pant interacted with either the device or the instructions, and stopped when they
had completed the last step in the configuration sequence. In the case of WPS we
defined this as when the participant released the WPS button, successfully acti-
vating it. For MultiNet it was defined as the point the participant first turned on
the device after successfully scanning the appropriate QR Code. These endpoints
were chosen so the different connection times for the two methods did not affect
the measured task times.
As well as task completion time we recorded whether the participant used
the available instructions. Instructions were placed face down in front of each
device and participants were asked to refer to them only if they felt they needed
to. Instructions were recorded as having been used if a participant turned them
over. After the participants had experienced both test conditions, a short semi-
structured interview was conducted to understand their broader reactions. Each
participant was asked the same questions and the answers were recorded for later
analysis.
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3.3.3 Results
The mean SUS scores attained in our trial are WPS 81.88 (SD = 13.24), and
MultiNet 92.50 (SD = 11.03). Empirical evaluation of large numbers of SUS
scores across a range of products has shown that scores above 73 indicate good
usability and score above 85 represent excellent usability [9]. The SUS scores
thus indicate that both WPS and MultiNet are usable solutions, with MultiNet
rated as more usable by the participants in our trial. A paired t-test on the SUS
scores shows this difference in usability to be significant (t(15) = 5.36, p < 0.001)
with MultiNet having the higher mean score.
The mean task time measurements for connecting the printer using WPS and
MultiNet were 127.56 seconds (SD = 69.23) and 48.06 seconds (SD = 46.69)
respectively. A paired t-test shows a significant difference in task time for the
printer of (t(15) = 5.65, p < 0.001) with MultiNet having the lower times. For
the Squeezebox Radio, the mean task time using WPS was 94.37 seconds (SD =
32.57) and using MultiNet was 15.55 seconds (SD = 9.76). Again, a paired t-test
shows a significant difference in task times for the Squeezebox Radio of (t(15) =
10.29, p < 0.001) with MultiNet having the lower times. Finally, connecting
the Laptop using WPS gave a mean task time of 49.87 seconds (SD = 33.6)
while using MultiNet the mean task time was 12.26 seconds (SD = 5.23). Once
more, a paired t-test shows a significant difference in task time for the Laptop of
(t(14) = 4.61, p < 0.001)1 with MultiNet having the lower times. These results
are summarised in Figure 3.6a. Analysing task completion time across all devices
show that, using WPS the mean task time was 91.47 seconds (SD = 57.21), while
using MultiNet the mean task time was 25.92 seconds (SD = 32.17). A paired
t-test shows a significant difference in task completion time (t(47) = 10.07, p <
0.001) with MultiNet achieving the lower mean times.
Observed instruction usage is shown in Figure 3.6b. Observing the trends
shown in Figure 3.6, task completion times decrease in proportion at least as
quickly with MultiNet as with WPS; and there is a marked decrease in instruction
use with MultiNet, from 16 to 3, compared with the small decrease from 16 to
1One participant experienced a hardware failure while configuring the laptop with WPS so
that data point has been removed.
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Figure 3.6: Evidence for the learnability of MultiNet.
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14 for WPS. This suggests that users found the consistent point and connect
interface of MultiNet easy to remember and learn.
3.4 Network performance
The purpose of our performance measurements is to examine the feasibility of
MultiNet for deployment in domestic environments given that the high number
of virtual access points it creates is outside the expected operating envelope of
the protocols and components.
3.4.1 Method
We constructed a test environment to measure throughput, latency and jitter
as the number of connected devices (and thus configured virtual access points)
increased. These metrics were chosen as they are standard indicators of network
performance. We used 27 identical Samsung R5800 laptops with fresh installs of
Microsoft Windows 7 as clients, and an eeePC netbook as the access point.
The standard networking tools ping and iperf were used to measure latency,
throughput (over TCP) and jitter (over UDP). For each of these three perfor-
mance indicators we configured the access point to offer the required number of
networks and to act as a traffic sink. The first Samsung laptop is configured to
act as a traffic source. Measurements were taken over a 60 second period after
which the access point was re-configured and the experiment repeated, each time
with an additional virtual access point created. We then repeated the whole
experiment three times to generate the full dataset.
3.4.2 Results
Figure 3.7a shows the access point to device throughput displays approximately
linear reduction as the number of networks and associated overheads increases,
as expected. At 20 networks there is a 13% reduction in maximum throughput,
and by 50 networks this figure has risen to 27%.
As the number of networks increases the latency on the networks also in-
creases from 8 ms to 15 ms for up to 20 networks (Figure 3.7b). Although there
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Figure 3.7: Device to access point network performance as the number of config-
ured networks increases. The mean ± standard error is shown
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appears to be the expected linear upward trend in per-packet latency as the
number of networks and associated overheads increases, the degree of variation
observed suggests that there are more significant factors directly affecting per-
packet latency.
The jitter increases notably for more than 30–35 networks, but seems rela-
tively constant when the number of networks is below that (Figure 3.7c).
These results quantify the performance of MultiNet, the increase in jitter and
latency and drop in throughput will impact different types of protocols running
over the network in different ways. To understand the impact of these findings
on the network we examine their affect on four main activities seen on a typical
network real-time streaming, web traffic and HTTP video streaming.
Real-time streaming protocols such as those used in Vice Over IP (VoIP),
gaming and real-time video streaming, for example, Real Time Streaming Pro-
tocol (RTSP) [78], are sensitive to throughput, latency and jitter. VoIP and
gaming have lower throughput requirements then video streaming. A minimum
of 5 Mbit/s is recommended for High Definition content streaming 1. MultiNet
is capable of delivering these speeds even when 50 networks are enabled.
However, real-time protocols are also effected by latency and jitter. Some
types of gaming are latency sensitive, for example, first person shooters. Larger
latencies, over 100ms, can reduce the players’ performance in these games [40].
At 50 networks Multinet adds 29ms to the overall latency. Depending on the
location of the gaming server typical broadband latencies are between 30ms and
100ms [84]. Therefore, the addition of an extra 29ms delay could be problematic
for this type of traffic in some cases. Jitter has less impact on gaming traffic with
values in the range of 100ms having been shown to be acceptable [6].
Real time video streaming and VoIP protocols can be severely effected by
jitter. Many of these protocols are dynamic altering the size of buffers and bitrates
in response to changes in network conditions. High jitter can make it difficult for
the adaption algorithms to settle on the correct type of action which can lead to
a poor user experience [90].
Web traffic generated via normal web browsing has bandwidth requirements
well below the levels that MultiNet provides. Modern web application page load
1https://help.netflix.com/en/node/306
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times are in the range of 5 to 20 seconds [92]. Hence the addition of a 29ms delay
is unlikely to significantly impact performance.
HTTP video streaming has become the default delivery method for video
content over the internet, with services like YouTube, Netflix and Iplayer using
the Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH) protocol. These have been
shown to be resilient to high latency and jitter [14, 53]
Overall these measurements show that MultiNet has a limited impact on net-
work performance for less then 25 networks, supporting its feasibility for deploy-
ment into the home.
3.5 Device connection time
Device connection times for MultiNet and WPS were also measured, to check that
MultiNet’s performance is comparable to existing systems. These measurements
were performed on the test setup described in the user study. This was motivated
by the need to check there were no adverse effects on device connection time with
different device types.
Device connection time has two components: the time required for the user to
complete the appropriate configuration steps to initiate device connection, and
the time taken for the relevant key exchanges and network configurations to take
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place to securely associate the device with the network. The first is measured in
our user trial, presented in Section 3.3. The second is independent of the user,
and is measured from the last step in the configuration process to the point at
which the device receives an IP address from the DHCP server running on the
access point.
This test was performed 16 times per device and averages calculated and
shown in Figure 3.8. In the case of the printer and Squeezebox, the average
device connection time is notably lower with MultiNet compared to WPS, but
the Windows 7 laptop connects more quickly with WPS than with MultiNet.
This is because the laptop connects when Windows 7 detects presence of the pre-
configured wireless network as it polls for available wireless networks, in contrast
to the user initiated action of connecting via WPS. If the user were to boot
the laptop after configuring the network, or were to manually initiate a poll, we
expect the connection time for the laptop would come down.
3.6 Discussion
This chapter sets out to answer Question 1.0: Are user-centred mechanisms for
infrastructure control beneficial for domestic networks? To address this question
one aspect of domestic infrastructure interaction was chosen to focus the work,
specifically Wi-Fi device association. This chapter has presented and evaluated
MultiNet, a new user-centred mechanism for joining devices to domestic wireless
networks. This discussion will highlight the findings and discuss the outcomes
for future domestic infrastructure deployments. To answer question 1.0 it was
broken down into four sub questions. Each will be discussed in turn below.
The first question was Q2.1: How should Wi-Fi device association be changed
to better fit domestic environments? It was evident from the literature that Wi-
Fi device association in domestic environments was troublesome, especially for
devices with limited interaction capabilities. In section 3.1 literature relating
to domestic networks and Wi-Fi device association were reviewed and ten de-
sign parameters were drawn up to guide the redesign of the device association
process. These design parameters covered three main areas. Firstly, the limita-
tions of non-technical domestic users. Second, contextual issues related to the
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domestic environment. Finally, technical issues such as the need for backwards
compatibility. These ten design parameters were then used to redesign the device
association process for domestic users. These design parameters highlight the
important factors at play in domestic Wi-Fi device association and answer the
question posed.
Once the design parameters were set, the process of redesigning and imple-
menting Wi-Fi device association provides the answers the Question 2.2: What
changes are required to the domestic network infrastructure to implement a user-
centred Wi-Fi device association method?. The benefits of out-of-band credential
exchange in this context were obvious from the literature, but how to implement
one without placing extra hardware burden on the devices and without breaking
backwards compatibility was the first challenge that had to be overcome. The
concept of configuring the network to the device was key to overcoming this bar-
rier. All Wi-Fi devices can store Wi-Fi network credentials. If a mechanism can
be found to pass credentials from a device to the access point then a network
could be created with the preconfigured credentials for the device to associate
with. It was known that the access point software could offer more than one
network per access point, but whether the upper limit existed was unknown. A
review of the 802.11 specification [4] uncovered a suggestion of a maximum of
four networks in a footnote. However, there was no concrete recommendation.
The code for the Atheros 802.11n Wi-Fi chip-set was reviewed and it could
be seen that the four device limit was implemented in the driver, but it could be
changed. Changing this for a higher number had no obvious impact on perfor-
mance and allowed the creation of many networks. After making this change it
was possible to create and mange many networks with hostapd. However, there
was a small problem. MultiNet required the new network to be added without
interrupting other devices on other networks offered by the same hostapd daemon.
By design hostapd disassociated all stations on all networks if its configuration is
changed. Hence, hostapd was modified to only disassociate devices on a network
if the network configuration had changed. These changes enabled the creation of
many networks. However, a method to create the out-of-band channel without
introducing hardware constraints on devices was still required.
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Creating an out-of-band channel for credential exchange without introducing
hardware constraints on devices was achieved by introducing a third device into
the association process, the Network Controller. The Network Controller can
accommodate any hardware required to implement the out-of-band channel that
we chose and provide, in this case a QR Code reader. The Network Controller
also provides an interface to the network to display relevant information and
provide a user interface. The implementation described here used a mobile phone
as the Network Controller to offer a low-cost upgrade path.
However, the concept of configuring the network to the device could be imple-
mented using other proximate out-of-band transfer techniques. For example, one
could easily replace the QR Codes with credentials encoded on a USB storage
device. In this scenario plugging a USB device into the access point would act
as the out-of-band channel, allowing the correct network to be configured on the
access point without need for a Network Controller. Adding the Network Con-
troller also meant adding an method for the access point and Network Controller
to communicate configuration changes. This was achieved using a Network Con-
troller specific WPA2 secured network over which a RESTful API was exposed,
providing the Network Controller access to the functionality of the access point.
These changes allow the implementation of a Wi-Fi device association method
for domestic environments that meet all ten of the design parameters outlined in
section 3.1. The changes to implement MultiNet were substantial. They involved
modifications to hardware drivers, user space daemon responsible for access point
and authentication functionality, the addition of new hardware and APIs. The
access point was significantly modified and new functionality was added to fulfil
the requirements of a user-centred mechanism for Wi-Fi device association.
However, all of the changes were in the software and none of the security
critical parts of the WPA2 protocol needed to be modified. This shows that
software changes to the underlying software supporting the domestic network
infrastructure can enable radical changes in the user interaction.
The changes required to implement MultiNet were significant. Moving to a
configuration with one network per device could potentially have a detrimental
effect on overall network performance. To understand this and answer Q1.3:
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What are the network performance implications of the redesigned infrastructure?,
a performance evaluation of MultiNet was undertaken.
This evaluation suggests that MultiNet is technically feasible. Although there
is a negative impact on throughput, latency and jitter, it is acceptably small for
up to 25 devices. While a 25 device cap is a limitation of MultiNet, this should
not significantly affect today’s domestic wireless deployments: participants in
our user trials reported a mean of 5.6 devices connected to their home networks,
which tallies with the 4.3 devices found in the 2011 Connectivity Report that
surveyed a thousand UK homes [76].
The observed performance loss requires further analysis, but our hypothesis
is that it may be related to both 802.11 beaconing interval and re-keying time.
A review of the hostapd software reveals that the beaconing intervals are config-
urable but the final determination of how and when they are sent is left to the
device driver. In the case of the ath9k driver used in these experiments there
are two modes of operation depending on the hardware version “For multi-bss ap
support beacons are either staggered evenly over N slots or burst together”(Line
491 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/beacon.c). It is unclear which strategy was
in use in our hardware. Further investigation would be required to resolve this
issue.
From the performance evaluation we can see that the modifications required
to build MultiNet have had a negative impact on overall network performance.
However, whether or not the usability improvements outweigh the performance
decrease would require further investigation with users.
Question 1.4: How the usability of the new method compares to existing
device association methods is a key question. Significant effort has been ex-
pended to design and build a user-centred mechanism for Wi-Fi device associa-
tion. MultiNet has two key modifications which aim to improve its usability in
domestic environments. Firstly, configuring the network infrastructure to the de-
vice and introducing a Network Controller has enabled a consistent configuration
metaphor without imposing new hardware or software constraints on devices, and
maintaining backwards compatibility with existing equipment. Second, MultiNet
also addresses the diverse, and often limited, interaction capabilities of modern
networked domestic devices by moving the configuration task from the devices
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to the Network Controller, in effect creating a single point of configuration for
joining any device to the network. This is achieved by creating and maintaining
multiple virtual access points.
The user trial shows that both WPS and MultiNet performed well in a lab
environment and all of the participants managed to complete the entire task in
both conditions. However, MultiNet produced significantly better SUS scores
across the trial, and all participants stated that they preferred MultiNet over
WPS. The dramatically reduced instruction usage observed as participants moved
through the task with MultiNet is an indication that the consistent interaction
approach was readily learned by users.
The qualitative comments also suggest a preference for the use of a Network
Controller and that this was more easily applicable to people’s domestic deploy-
ments where access to the access point is often limited. The participants also
highlighted a number of real world issues with WPS, commenting on the prob-
lems arising from the spatial arrangement of the networking infrastructure in
their homes and its unsuitability for distributed devices. One limitation of the
user study is that the usability of bootstrapping the Network Controller was not
considered. It was felt that this was not necessary as the boot strapping is a
one-off task that uses a roughly similar interaction to normal device association.
The overarching question this chapter set out to begin to address is Q1.0: Are
user-centred mechanisms for infrastructure control beneficial for domestic net-
works? While this chapter does not fully answer this question, it has been shown
that by redesigning network infrastructure to create user-centred mechanisms for
infrastructure control, in the case of Wi-Fi device association, it produces a dif-
ferent association mechanism. That, in lab based usability tests, has been shown
to improve usability over the currently deployed methods. This is a encouraging
result that shows that if users have the correct infrastructure, network manage-
ment problems can be resolved. The approach taken in this chapter has merit in
this case. Applying user-centred design principles to other issues within domestic
networks may also yield interesting results.
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3.7 Limitations
One presumption in the design of MultiNet is the availability of a Network Con-
troller. The Network Controller is required to complete the configuration process
and reusing an existing device offers a low cost path to adoption. We envisage
this actually being an app on a mobile device such as a smartphone, analogous
to the approach taken by Cisco in their “Connect Cloud” platform.
However, the concept of configuring the network to the device could be im-
plemented using other proximate Out-of-Band transfer techniques. For example,
one could easily replace the QR Codes with credentials encoded on a USB storage
device. In this scenario plugging the USB device into the AP would act as the
Out-of-Band channel, allowing the correct network to be configured on the access
point without need for a Network Controller.
The performance evaluation of MultiNet is not complete. More work is re-
quired to locate the root cause of the observed performance decrease. Further
performance evaluation is also required to assess the impact of MultiNet on a
busy network with many devices.
In the next chapter, user-centred presentations of network activity are ex-
plored. A new technical probe, HomeNetViewer, is constructed using a user-
centred design approach. HomeNetViewer’s goal is to to investigate user-centred
presentations of network activity with the aim of improving domestic network
legibility.
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Chapter 4
User-centred presentations of
network activity
This chapter explores the use of user-centred presentations of network activity
to improve domestic network legibility. The empirical studies by Tolmie et al.
show that domestic network use is controlled by the creation of locally negotiated
policies between the members of the household [26]. These rules are often not
expressed in the network: they live in the social fabric of the household.
Brundell et al. also found that users discuss and characterise their network
usage not around protocols or forms of traffic, but rather, specific applications
and activities performed on the network [18]. The enforcement of these rules are
flexible and are often a negotiation between the occupants of the household.
In contrast, the tools currently provided to manage domestic networks are
based around abstractions useful to trained network administrators. Their vo-
cabulary is one full of technical terms such as port numbers, MAC addresses and
IP addresses. The rules that can be expressed and enforced using these tools are
inflexible.
The challenge this chapter addresses is not how to encode the rules and policies
required by domestic users in the network infrastructure, but how to support
users in the social task of understanding and monitoring their networks. This
approach is in line with that suggested by Crabtree et al. [26]. This chapter sets
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out to achieve this by continuing the theme of reinventing the domestic network
infrastructure to support self-management by domestic users.
In this chapter the design, construction and evaluation of a system for user-
centred presentation and annotation of network traffic is presented. Inspiration
for this work came from the findings of Costanza’s work with domestic energy
consumption data [22]. Costanza found that by using time-series historical vi-
sualisation for energy data with user annotation that users’ could better relate
complex energy data to their everyday lives. This finding provides an interest-
ing starting point for the development of a domestic network data visualisation
platform. Costanza’s work relates energy data to physical actions. This chapter
explores how to relate network data to online actions, with the aim of improving
users’ understanding of their network usage.
The approach taken is to provide an interface to visualise what has happened
or is happening on the network and allow users to annotate features they find
interesting in the traffic. The annotation of interesting features will provide a
record of events on the network, annotated in the users’ own language. It is
envisaged that this will enable users to easily inspect what has happened on their
network to ensure local rules are being adhered to. This chapter addresses the
following questions:
Q3.0 Do user-centred presentations of network data improve network legibility?
Q3.1 Of the data flowing through the domestic network access point, which are
best suited for use in user annotation?
Q3.2 Are interactive time-series historical visualisations appropriate in the con-
text of domestic network data?
Q3.3 Is the use of activities, applications and users an appropriate language to
annotate domestic network data?
Q3.4 How do users feel about the increased network legibility?
To address the above questions this work is split into four phases. Firstly, the
initial design phase, where user-centred design practices and local expert knowl-
edge are applied to develop a system to visualise and annotate home network data
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called HomeNetViewer. Data collected in a previous Homework deployment [63],
in real UK households, is used to create the first prototype of HomeNetViewer.
This enables questions Q3.1 and Q3.2 to be explored.
Second, the iterative design phase, where the prototype system is incremen-
tally improved with a single domestic user from the household who provided the
initial data. The third phase is a set of controlled deployments to road test
HomeNetViewer before the final phase. Finally, the deployment phase, where
HomeNetViewer is deployed in four real UK households to begin to address Q3.3
and Q3.4. In the next section the initial system design is presented.
4.1 System design
In the design phase a user-centred approach is taken to the construction of the
visualisation and annotation interface. The initial interface was developed using
five months of traffic captured at a single family household in 2012 using the
Homework router platform [63]. Firstly, this section outlines the factors at play
for a domestic network data visualisation and annotation platform, in terms of
the audience, purpose, context and systems. This will provide an overview of the
context in which HomeNetViewer is deployed and will inform the initial system
design.
Audience: the audience for HomeNetViewer are domestic network users,
specifically ones that need to negotiate acceptable use of the domestic network.
The literature shows that users of domestic networks are often non-technical and
have no desire to become networking experts. The typical user is familiar with
the Internet, but not the underlying technical infrastructure. The audience for
this system is envisaged to be mainly parents, but not exclusively. Other types
of households may also find increased visibility beneficial. For example, a shared
household may wish to use this system to resolve bandwidth contention issues.
Purpose: the purpose of the system is to support domestic users in the gener-
ation and monitoring of locally negotiated network rules and policies. The system
should provide users of domestic network with a simple method to navigate and
annotate their network data. The system will use interactive time-series histori-
cal visualisation as the main interface and activities and users as the annotation
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meta-data. These annotations can then be used as a view of what is happening
and what has happened on the network. The main goal of the visualisation is to
enable the users to check that locally negotiated policies are being followed.
Context: the domestic context is a complex socio technical system. Each
household is different in terms of the technology deployed, the number, types,
and manufacturers of devices. There will be a mix of wired and wireless devices
and these may be mobile or used at a fixed location within the home. The way
in which the devices are used also varies between households depending on the
goals of its users. In domestic households devices are also often shared, used by
many users, sometimes in groups or by individuals.
Systems and data: currently deployed domestic access points are often lim-
ited in computational power and storage capacity, although recent trends toward
App-enabled routers are moving in the direction of increased computing power
and functionality. The home access point is an important piece of the domestic
infrastructure. Hence, reliability and performance are important considerations.
This work aims to create user-centred visualisations of the data flowing through
the domestic access point. Therefore, the access point needs to be modified to
collect and store the data passing through it. Rather then constructing this from
scratch this work builds upon the Homework router platform [63]. The Homework
router platform is used to provide Wi-Fi, routing and data logging functionality.
Homework is built on an Eee-PC running Ubuntu. Homework utilises Open
vSwitch1 for forwarding and OpenFlow2 to manage the behaviour of the switch. It
provides logging of Wi-Fi RSSI, HTTP traffic(via DPI), IP Flows, DHCP Leases,
and connected devices. Details of the data collected and how the collection was
implemented are provided below:
Wi-Fi RSSI is the Received Signal Strength Indicator. An integer value be-
tween 0 and 100, representing the power of the receive signal at the end station
or client device. The RSSI is calculated by the 802.11 compliant hardware on the
client device and reported back to the home access point. There is no defined
standard for the generation of the RSSI value. Therefore, different devices may
report different values when receiving the same signal at the same location.
1http://www.openvswitch.org
2https://www.opennetworking.org/sdn-resources/onf-specifications/openflow
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However, high RSSI values are associated with a strong signal and good net-
work performance and low values are a indicator of poor performance. The re-
lationship between performance and RSSI make this an important property for
troubleshooting Wi-Fi performance problems. The RSSI information is part of
the 802.11 physical layer, so to extract it we require access to the raw 802.11
frames. Frame interception is achieved using Radiotap1, a tool that allows the
injection and reception or raw 802.11 frames on Linux. For each frame received
the RSSI is extracted and stored along with the client MAC address and frame
timestamp into the Homework database. This functionality was provided as stan-
dard by the Homework platform.
DHCP Leases and connected devices: DHCP Leases are generated when a
device joins the network and uses the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol to
receive configuration information. DHCP is responsible for the allocation of IP
addresses on the local network. The DHCP service was provided by the Dnsmasq
daemon2 and logging was provided by the Homework platform. For each DHCP
event Homework logged event timestamps, client MAC address, client IP address,
client hostname and event type. The event type was either add or delete. The
event records can then be processed to provide time ranges describing when each
device held a particular IP address.
IP Flows: a Flow is defined as “a set of IP packets passing an Observation
Point in the network during a certain time interval. All packets belonging to a
particular Flow have a set of common properties.” [21]. In this case the Obser-
vation Point was the domestic access point. Each request to and response from
a remote server would generate an IP Flow record which was timestamped and
stored in a database on the access point for later retrieval.
DNS requests: Domain Name System requests are generated whenever a client
on the network needs to convert a host name into an IP address. The DNS service
was provided by the Dnsmasq daemon and logging was enabled. The DNS logs
were periodically parsed and hostname to IP address mappings were extracted.
These mappings are very valuable, especially in the case of web browsing, as the
hostname looked up in the DNS request is the one entered by the user.
1http://www.radiotap.org/
2http://www.thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/
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This is important as it can be used in place of a reverse DNS lookup which
converts an IP address back into a hostname. Reverse DNS lookups have two
limitations which make their use undesirable. Firstly, they are slow to perform.
Second, the hostname they return are not necessarily the same as the host name
looked up, due to the use of DNS based load balancing in modern network ap-
plications. One other limitation of DNS logs is that many client devices cache
DNS requests. Hence, the DNS logs do not provide a full picture of the number
of times a particular host is contacted.
HTTP traffic: the Homework platform collects HTTP traffic information us-
ing deep packet inspection techniques. It extracts the HTTP headers from the
packets captured using libpcap as they pass through the access point. For each
HTTP request the system logs the current timestamp, protocol, source IP ad-
dress, source port, destination IP address, destination port, server hostname and
the full URL including the query string. For hosts accessed using HTTPS it is not
possible to access the hostname, URL or query string, so these are not present in
the logs.
The above section provides an overview of the context into which the system
will be deployed. The next section discusses the ethical implications of deploying
this system into peoples homes.
4.1.1 Ethical considerations
Early on in the design phase of the work a number of ethical issues were raised.
These affect the design choices and evaluation of HomeNetViewer. The main
ethical concern is that HomeNetViewer changes the visibility of domestic network
activity. The currently deployed systems offer little or no insight into the data
flowing through the network. Hence, most activities are hidden from other users
in the household.
HomeNetViewer changes this and will make all activity visible to some de-
gree to all users of the domestic network. This increased visibility leads to the
possibility of causing embarrassment to the participants. Embarrassment may
arise for two reasons. Firstly, if data seen by an another family member exposes
an activity considered unacceptable within that household. Second, if a matter
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considered private by a user is exposed to another user. For example, a medical
condition.
A number of approaches were explored to address the potential for embarrass-
ment. Firstly, a pro-active approach was considered, where users could opt-out
of data logging for a particular device before performing certain activities. This
requires planning and foresight on part of the user and could easily be forgotten.
Therefore, it does not fully mitigate the risk of embarrassment.
Another approach considered was to hide all data until a user agrees to make
it public within the household. However, this approach is fundamentally flawed.
The system does not know which user generated the traffic. Therefore, it cannot
know who to ask for permission to release the data.
The final approach examined is a retrospective solution allowing users to re-
move traffic they do not wish others in the household to see. While this has
some benefits over the other methods it still leaves a window of opportunity of
embarrassment to be caused.
None of the explored approaches were perfect and a combined approach would
have probably been the best solution. However, this would have significantly in-
creased the complexity of the interface and potentially affect data quality. Hence,
a pragmatic approach was adopted.
During the deployment of HomeNetViewer it was ensured that all participant
were fully aware of the data that could be seen within the system and informed
that anyone in the household could see these data. All members of the household
were asked to sign a consent form agreeing to this and extra care was taken when
explaining the system to children and young adults. Participants were also able to
withdraw their consent any time. If just one member of any household withdrew
the whole system would be removed from the household and the data destroyed.
This approach was deemed acceptable by the Ethical Review Committee respon-
sible for the School of Computer Science at The University of Nottingham.
In the next section the development of the initial HomeNetViewer prototype
is presented.
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4.1.2 Prototype interface
The starting point for the prototype of the HomeNetViewer platform is the inter-
active time-series historical visualisation used by Costanza for domestic energy
consumption data [22]. However, the data flowing through the domestic network
are significantly different and more complex than the data available from domes-
tic energy monitors. Domestic network data have many values at a single point
in time representing different activities taking place on a device, in contrast to
the single energy consumption figure visualised in Costanza’s work.
The first step was to look for data that could be easily represented on a simple
time-line. Wi-Fi RSSI and incoming and outgoing bandwidth were the obvious
choices. A simple interface displaying these on a time-line was constructed. The
ability to “drill down” into the lower level activity at a particular point in time
was then added. This took the form of a pop-up window displaying the raw data
from the DHCP, DNS, IP Flow and HTTP traffic logs.
The early attempts at visualising this data quickly became cluttered and over-
loaded with technical information, such as port numbers, IP addresses, and MAC
addresses. It was clear that we needed to reduce the complexity of the data to
build a usable visualisation. Traffic on port 80 accounted for approximately 53%
of all IP Flows with another 6% on port 443. These correspond to HTTP and
HTTPS respectively. The remaining 41% of IP Flows were distributed over 57,248
other ports. For example, port 53 (DNS) accounted for 0.7% of IP Flows. Given
the dominance of HTTP and HTTPS traffic in the dataset it was decided to focus
the interface on exploring this, rather than traffic on all ports. One benefit of
focusing on HTTP is that users are somewhat familiar with its main identifying
features: the URL, and the host and domain names they contain. HTTPS traffic
was not included in this prototype as the logging mechanism relied on deep packet
inspection and therefore was unable to extract data from the packets due to the
encryption.
The focus on HTTP traffic does not mean the rest of the traffic is completely
hidden. Non-HTTP activity, for example Skype and Bit-torrent, leave traces in
the HTTP logs. These clues take the form of either visits to related websites (e.g.
BitTorrent search engines) or accessing interface and updates over HTTP (e.g.
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Skype’s interface is an embedded web page). It was also possible to see periods
of high bandwidth which is an indication of activity on the network.
After the basic visualisation interface had been built the functionality to col-
lect annotations from users was added. The prototype interface allowed collection
of, device ownership, user ground truth and activity ground truth annotations as
free text. The annotation interface consisted of a set of time-lines for each device
connected to the network.
Each set of time-lines were labelled with the device hostname, where available,
or the device MAC address if no hostname was captured. The devices could be
renamed by the users to a more human friendly name if required. It was also
possible to assign an owner to each of the devices in the interface. The time-
lines represented Wi-Fi RSSI, bandwidth (inbound and outbound) and annotated
HTTP visits along with other annotations added by the users. An interface was
constructed to allow any section of the time-line to be selected and inspected in
more detail using a wizard style interface.
In the detailed view users were shown a nested list of all the remote hosts
that were contacted in that time frame grouped by domain name. Users were
instructed to examine the list to find a domain/host that they recognised. They
were then asked to add “tags”, relating to the activity most likely to have caused
them to visit that domain/host. Tags were entered as free text with a list of
previously entered tags displayed to improve consistency and reduce duplication.
After this process users were taken to another screen where they could see the
annotations they had just created on a time-line, and add extra information on
which users were using the device and what they believed they were doing.
The prototype interface was shown to a number of local networking and HCI
experts and two important changes were made. Firstly, it was noted that the
domain/host annotation interface was cluttered with a large number of HTTP
requests related to the delivery of online advertising. These made it more difficult
to scan the list and find the domains/hosts of interest to human activity. Using a
freely available list of advertising domains created to enable adverts to be blocked1
we were able to filter out some of the advertisement related traffic. This reduced
the number of domains/hosts displayed to the user by 17%.
1http://pgl.yoyo.org/adservers/
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Second, it was also noted that the URLs extracted from the HTTP headers
contained more information than just the domain/host. For example, the full
path of the page and data submitted using the GET method were also available.
This includes search terms entered by users into search engines like Bing and
Google. It was hypothesised that search terms would provide valuable contextual
information for human annotation so it was decided to add this information into
the interface. Search terms were extracted from major search engines (Google,
Bing, Yahoo) and shopping sites (Amazon, E-bay). These were then displayed
on the interface as blue dots on the device time-line. When the user moved the
mouse over the blue dot the extracted search term was displayed.
At this stage a working prototype system for collecting and visualising do-
mestic network data had been created. It was possible to include a prospective
user into the design process. This was achieved through three iterative design
sessions were undertaken with the data owner. This iterative design process, and
the modifications made as a result, are described in the next section.
4.1.3 Iterative design with home-owner
After improving HomeNetViewer based on local expert feedback, one occupant
from the household where the original dataset was collected was recruited to
take part in a study. The study aimed to explore their network data using the
prototype HomeNetViewer interface. This study took the form of three one-
hour iterative design sessions. The first focused on the user interface, the second
focused on the annotation process and the final session was to perform a full
annotation of three weeks of traces.
The participant was compensated with a £25 Amazon voucher for any in-
convenience. These sessions led to a number of usability improvements to the
interface and an opportunity to observe a real user annotating their own data.
Next we discuss the observations from each session, the impact on the system
and where appropriate how the system was changed in response.
The first session focused on the interactive visualisation and data navi-
gation. The participant was comfortable with the time-line view and generally
understood what was being displayed without any prompting. The ability to
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move backwards and forwards through the data one day at a time was considered
useful.
However, the participant was frustrated that they could not see more of the
data at once. They suggested that the addition of a week view and the ability
to zoom out would be an advantage. Another issue raised by the participant was
that they needed to do a lot of scrolling to view all of the devices.
Our initial interface showed all the devices on one page, with each device
separated by a heading and horizontal rule. The household being examined had
a large number of devices which led to very long pages. To address this issue, the
interface was changed to a tabbed style with one device on each tab.
The second session focused on the annotation interface and leads to four
interesting observations. Firstly, was specifically related to the annotation inter-
face. The initial prototype was based on a wizard style interaction where the
users was led through a series of screens and asked to input the relevant infor-
mation. This quickly became tiresome as most of the screens were unnecessary
if you only wanted to annotate a single piece of data. This caused a redesign of
the interaction and interface around a toolbar containing four tools rather than
a wizard of four screens.
The second observation was that device ownership is not an indication of
exclusivity of use. When asked to assign an owner to any device that was for
the sole use of one occupant, the participant stated that this was not possible.
In this household some people are considered to own certain devices. However,
it would not be unusual to find any member of the household using any device.
The participant elaborated by saying “That’s my phone, and it’s mainly me
who uses it, but quite often my wife will pick it up and do a quick google”.
This fluidity of use is present across all devices in the participant’s household,
therefore attributing traffic to a user solely based on the device is not possible in
this case. Whether this is a trend across all households and device types requires
the collection of more data. This observation did not directly affect the design of
the system, but may have implications for the data analysis and provided a topic
of discussion in the exit interviews.
The third observation was that some domains have a strong link to an individ-
ual user. On a number of occasions the participant stated that the site could only
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have been visited by one member of their family. This observation led to the ad-
dition of the “host/domain user” tag to collect this information. These site seem
to appear multiple times in the dataset and are often related to specific interests.
For example, visits to soundsandgear.com and deviantart.net, were related to one
householders music interests and another’s art hobby.
The forth observation relates to the visualisation and access to search terms.
These proved both interesting and controversial for a number of reasons. Firstly,
search terms appear to be a good indicator of user activity. It was trivial for
the participant to suggest the activity that generated each group of search terms
shown on the interface. Second, search terms could in some cases be linked back
to users, based on the content of the search and knowledge of the users’ interests.
Third, search terms were good prompts for particular events, even though the
traces were over one year old. On a number of occasions the participant was able
to remember specific events and activities related to some of the search terms.
Finally, search terms were surprisingly intrusive. The participant expressed
some discomfort at the level of information that was available. This discomfort
was heightened as they seemed unaware that this information was present in the
network traces. However, search terms also offer a real insight into the activities
and interests of the users on the network there is one major limitation. The
search terms are not machine readable, they are human input and often contain
obscure references to places and people. Parsing and categorising them so that
they would be usable in an automated fashion is an open question for the natural
language processing community.
The final session focused on the annotation of a three week section of traffic
data. The modifications suggested in the first two sessions were implemented in
this version of the interface before the session. Overall feedback on the interface
from this session was positive. The new streamlined annotation interface was
much quicker to use, and the participant stated they found it a much less frus-
trating experience. Next, the test deployment of HomeNetViewer is discussed.
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4.1.4 Test deployment
After HomeNetViewer had been designed and built it went through a period
of real world testing. The test deployments were in the researchers’ homes to
simulate the full deployment. This revealed one important problem. Since the
collection of the data used to build the prototype, many search engines, shopping
sites and social networks had moved to a default HTTPS policy. The Homework
HTTP logger uses deep packet inspection to extract the URLs visited, but en-
cryption prevents this from working. Hence, extracting domain names and search
terms to display back to the users presented a significant technical challenge for
the system deployment.
Three solutions to this problem were considered. The First solution explored
was to perform a reverse DNS lookup on the IP addresses in the Flows table.
This would convert the IP address into a human readable hostname for use in
the interface. However, this was ineffective, due to the use of load balancing and
content delivery networks. Due to the techniques used the reply from a reverse
DNS lookup often bears no resemblance to the hostname entered in the URL by
the user.
Second, the DNS lookups could be captured using a DNS proxy. The cached
DNS lookup would contain the hostname entered by the users. This could then
be used to annotate the IP Flow data retrospectively. This has the advantage of
being unobtrusive, but it only allows us to perform host name annotations. Any
analysis that requires deep packet inspection is still not possible.
The third solution is to use a transparent proxy that can perform a man-in-
the-middle function, decrypting and encrypting the traffic as it passes through
the domestic access point. This allows an opportunity to perform deep packet
inspection and extract the information on the URLs visited and search terms
submitted. This solution has the disadvantage that it breaks the expectation of
the users that HTTPS is securely encrypted end to end.
Squid1, a widely used HTTP proxy, has the ability to transparently intercept
HTTPS traffic using a module called SSL bump. Squid acts as a man-in-the-
middle and intercepts any HTTPS CONNECT requests it observes. Squid then
1http://www.squid-cache.org/
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initiates one HTTPS connection from itself to the remote server using the stan-
dard SSL protocol and receives the requested data. The remote server certificate
is then used with its own certificate to create a self-signed certificate which is
used to encrypt the connection to the requesting client on the local network.
This self-signed certificate is not signed by a trusted Root Authority causing
most web browsers and devices to display a certificate error. This can be overcome
on desktop and mobile devices designed to be used in enterprise environments by
installing the public key of the Squid certificate into the device key store and web
browsers trusted certificate store.
This strategy works well in an enterprise environment. However, during the
test deployment of HomeNetViewer some problems were encountered. Some
closed consumer devices cannot be configured to accept new root certificates.
In these cases some devices will just ignore the error and work as normal, but
others do not and fail to operate as expected. Examples seen during testing were
the Sky NOWTV box and the Sony PlayStation 4.
To overcome this we attempted to black-list the problematic domains iden-
tified above by excluding them from the HTTPS interception. Unfortunately,
this was not possible. When deciding whether or not to intercept traffic the only
information available to Squid is the destination IP address. IP address based
black-listing is ineffective due to the use of load-balancing and content delivery
networks that causes the IP addresses to change unpredictably over time. Host
name based black-listing, is also not possible due the reverse DNS queries return-
ing different host names to those accessed by the client.
The final approach adopted was to use a white-list. The DNS logs were used
to extract the IP addresses for “sites of interest”. Sites of interest were chosen
before the deployment and were sites that were expected to contain search terms
(Google, Bing, YouTube for example). The IP addresses of the sites of interest
were provided to Squid to enable HTTPS interception only for those addresses.
This approach was successful, but had one draw back. The first time an IP was
returned for a particular hostname of interest it would not be intercepted until
the DNS logs had been parsed and the Squid configuration updated. This means
that the first few requests over HTTPS for a site of interest are not available for
deep packet inspection. For all other HTTPS traffic the DNS logs were used to
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Figure 4.1: A system overview of HomeNetViewer data collection and annotation
platform.
convert IP addresses into host names to provide as much information to the user
as possible within the visualisation.
4.2 The final system
In this section a complete description of HomeNetViewer is presented as it was
deployed into the participants’ homes. An overview of the system can be seen
in Figure 4.1. Firstly, a description of the interactive visualisation designed to
enable the exploration of this data is presented. Finally, the annotation data
collection interface is discussed alongside a description of the type of annotations
collected and the data they contain.
4.2.1 Interactive visualisation
The interactive visualisation allows the manipulation of two dimensions, the de-
vice and time window. The default view is to display a set of stacked time-lines
representing a one day period (an example is provided in Figure 4.2). Each time-
line represents one data source generated from the raw data or user annotations.
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Figure 4.2: Final annotation interface for a single device.
The active device can be changed by selecting a new tab which is named with
the device hostname.
The time window can be altered in a number of ways. Firstly, it is possible
to switch between a one day and week view using a button on the top toolbar.
Second, the user can step through the data using the next and previous buttons.
The user can also select any section in the visible time window and zoom in to see
a larger view presented in a pop-up window. Finally, the user can zoom out which
doubles the time range shown each time the tool is activated. The visualisation
also provides an aggregated view across all devices. This view shows cumulative
representation of all the data collected from all devices on the network.
4.2.2 Annotation capabilities
The interface was also designed to collect annotations, including device ownership,
device usage, user annotations and activity ground truth annotations. There were
a number of styles of activity and user annotations these are described below:
• Host/Domain activity annotations represent the activity the users at-
tribute to the most likely cause for them to visit a particular domain/host.
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Figure 4.3: Host/domain annotation interface
• Host/Domain user annotations were designed to take advantage of the
observation that some hosts/domains have a strong link to an individual.
These tags represent the links between users and host and/or domains.
• Search activity annotations capture the knowledge of the annotating user
concerning the most likely activity that could have generated a single search
term.
• Search user annotations are based on the observation that some searches
are easily identifiable as being generated by a specific user. These tags
encode the link between a particular search and a user.
• Free user annotations were designed to allow self reporting of device usage
by users.
• Free activity annotations allow users to self report the activity they were
engaged in over a particular time range.
The main interface provides four tools to collect the above annotations: the
what tool, the who tool, the sites tool and the searches tool. The tools can be
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seen in the top left of Figure 4.2. These tools are all activated using the same
user interaction. Firstly, the users select an interesting portion of the time-line
using the mouse, then activates the desired tool by clicking on it in the toolbar.
This highlighted section of the time-line could then be annotated. This select
and activate interaction was chosen as it enables the vast amounts of data to be
effectively filtered by time, reducing the complexity of the annotation task. Each
tool is described in turn below.
The what tool is designed to collect per device free activity annotations.
When activated a menu is displayed below the button. It contains a text-box to
enter the activity and a set of radio buttons to toggle between public and private.
When the user selects the text box a list of all previously entered activities is
shown to enable the selection of repeated activities. The list of available options
is filtered as the user types. When the annotation is saved the selected time
range, enter tag, annotating user, device and visibility are saved to the database
and the interface is updated to show the new annotation.
The who tool is designed to collect per device free user annotations. Once
the user has selected the desired time range they can select the users from a drop
down list. On selection the selected time range, selected user, annotating user,
device are saved to the database and the interface updated to show the new data.
The sites tool is designed to collect host/domain activity tags and host/domain
user tags. The interface can be seen in Figure 4.3. The nested list on the left hand
side shows all the remote hosts that were contacted in the selected time-frame
grouped by domain name that have not been tagged. Users can examine the
list to find domain/hostnames that they recognise. They can then add “tags”,
relating to the activity that most likely caused a visit to that site. This interface
also allows users to be assigned to domains/hosts by selecting them from a drop
down.
The searches tool is used to collect search user and search activity tags.
When it is activated the searches logged in the selected time frame are displayed
as an ordered list with duplicates removed. The user can then assign activity and
user to any of the listed searches.
All the tools also provide a drop down list of previously entered tags, where
possible. This was included to increase the accuracy and consistency of the
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meta-data and reduce duplicate and mistyped entries. The tools also supported
public and private annotations enabling the entry of private annotations which are
hidden from other users. The next section describes the “In the wild” deployment
of HomeNetViewer including how the system was deployed, the experimental
method and a description of the participating households.
4.3 HomeNetViewer deployment
The real world deployment of HomeNetViewer has three main objectives. The
first is to collect real world annotated domestic network data to explore the utility
of interactive time-line visualisation for domestic users. The second objective is
to explore users’ reactions to the visualisation platform and the increased trans-
parency it affords. The final objective is to gather data on the language and
terminology domestic users use to describe their network activity. Next an out-
line of the practicalities of the deployment are given.
4.3.1 Method
HomeNetViewer was deployed in four participating households for a period of
three weeks. Three weeks was chosen to provide sufficient data for analysis while
minimising the disruption for participants. Due to the length of the deploy-
ment and the intrusive nature of the data collection recruitment of participants
proved difficult. This led to an opportunistic sampling strategy where interested
households were recruited. However, attempts were made to recruit households
of different demographics to improve the quality of the sample. Participating
households were compensated with a £50 Amazon voucher for any inconvenience
caused. The deployment consisted of three visits to each household. Next we
detail the content of the visits.
The goal of the first visit was to perform the installation of HomeNetViewer
and provide initial training to users. Installation consisted of several steps. Ini-
tially the existing state of the network was documented, to enable its reinstate-
ment after the deployment. The existing Wi-Fi network was then disabled and
HomeNetViewer configured with the same BSSID and passphrase to replace it.
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This enabled all existing configured Wi-Fi devices to connect directly to Home-
NetViewer. Wired devices were unplugged from the existing router and plugged
into HomeNetViewer to enable their traffic to be captured. HomeNetViewer’s
uplink was then connected to the existing router via Ethernet to enable traffic to
be routed through the existing Internet connection to the rest of the world.
The next phase of the installation was to install HomeNetViewer’s public SSL
certificate into all compatible devices key-stores and web browsers trusted root
certificate stores. This involved manually configuring each device, at this point
the connectivity of each devices was checked. The final stage of the installation
was to check that all the other devices on the network such as streaming media
boxes and networked printers were functioning as expected.
After installation all the family members were gathered and the basic opera-
tion of the interface was explained. The operation of each of the four tools was
explained and the visualisation was explored. During training care was taken
not to lead the participants into using any particular terminology to describe the
data. During the demonstration, at points that required the entry of tags or
annotations the participants were asked to suggest the terms used.
The second visit to the household was two days after the first visit. This was
a quick follow up visit lasting approximately thirty minutes. Its main purpose
was to ensure that the installation was performing as expected, the users were
annotating their data, and to answer any questions raised by the participants’
recent use of the HomeNetViewer.
The final visit took place three weeks after installation. The first task was
to quickly review the annotated data with the participants to ensure that we
had good coverage of annotations. The network was then returned to its initial
state and HomeNetViewer was removed. After the deployment a set of semi-
structured exit interviews were conducted with each household. The next section
describes the participants recruited and the make-up of their domestic network
infrastructure.
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4.3.2 Participating households
HomeNetViewer was deployed in four real households in the UK for a period of
three weeks. This section provides information on the social and technical make-
up of the participating households. Participants’ names have been anonymised
to protect their identities.
Household 1 (H1): a four person family home with two adults and two school
aged children, more information can be seen in Table 4.1. They had ten network
connected devices that were in use during the study.
Household 2 (H2): a four person family home with two working adults and
one school aged child, more information can be seen in Table 4.2. This house-
hold also had a second young adult who was away at university for most of the
deployment period and returned for the weekend towards the end of the study.
They had fourteen network connected devices.
Household 3 (H3) : a four person family home with two working adults and
two school age children, see Table 4.3. They had twelve devices connected to
their network.
Household 4 (H4) : a two person family home with two retired adults. They
had 6 devices actively in use on their network.
User Gender Role occupation Age
H1U1 Male Head of Household Teacher 40-44
H1U2 Female Child Secondary School 15-19
H1U3 Female Child Further Education 15-19
H1U4 Female Head of Household Nurse 45-49
Table 4.1: Household 1 participant information
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User Gender Role occupation Age
H2U1 Male Head of Household Phd Student 35-39
H2U2 Female Adult University Student 15-19
H2U3 Female Child Secondary School 15-19
H2U4 Female Head of Household Self Employed 40-44
Table 4.2: Household 2 participant information
User Gender Role occupation Age
H3U1 Female Head of Household Child Minder 35-39
H3U2 Male Head of Household Self Employed 40-45
H3U3 Male Child Secondary school 10-14
H3U4 Female Child Primary school 5-9
Table 4.3: Household 3 participant information
User Gender Role occupation Age
H4U1 Male Head of Household Retired Solicitor 65-70
H4U2 Female Head of Household Retired Academic 65-70
Table 4.4: Household 4 participant information
4.3.3 Results: data annotations
In this section the results for the deployment are discussed. Firstly, an overview of
the annotations added to the data by the participants is presented before moving
on to the results of the exit interviews.
H1 H2 H3 H4
Host/Domain activity tags 98 135 47 42
Host/Domain user tags 29 32 47 34
Search activity tags 195 218 0 0
Search user tags 155 228 0 0
Free user 112 241 110 57
Free activity 0 124 103 43
Table 4.5: Annotations entered per household per annotation type
Table 4.5 shows the number of each type of annotation created by each house-
hold. We can see that most households used most of the annotation types. How-
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Figure 4.4: One day’s annotated traffic combined (all devices) in household 1
ever, Household 1 did not provide any free activity annotations and Households
3 and 4 did not provide any Search activity or Search User annotations.
As the users added their annotations to the system the visualisation updated,
an example of one days annotated traffic across all devices in Household 1 can be
seen in Figure 4.4. One day’s traffic for a single mobile device in Household 1 can
be seen in Figure 4.5. Two interesting features can also be seen in Figure 4.5.
Firstly, marked with a red box and numbered 1 we can see a period of user
activity (indicated by the presence of search terms) that has not been annotated.
Second, marked with a red box and numbered 2 is an example of a social net-
working site appearing to be in use where there is no other activity that indicates
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Figure 4.5: One day’s annotated data for a shared device in household 1
that a user is present. This is an example of automated traffic caused by the
polling behaviour of some modern web applications.
4.3.4 Results: exit interviews
Exit interviews were performed at the end of the study and all participants were
requested to be present. The interviews lasted about forty five minutes and
where focused around five themes. The themes covered were: practicalities of the
annotation process, utility of the annotated data, reactions to search term data,
the language of annotation and finally privacy.
Annotation practicalities. When the participants were asked “who did the
data annotation and how long did you spend completing the task?” the replies
were similar across all the households:
H1U1 “I did most of the annotation, and I found it very time consuming. I did
it in batches ... 2 or 3 days at once ... when I had a bit of spare time. It
was difficult to get anyone else to do it. They sometimes helped, but only
if I asked them a question.”
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H2U2 “The tagging? I did all of it, it took me about 10-15 minutes each day.”
H3U1 “It was me, I sometimes asked people if I was unsure what to put. I did
it every couple of days and it took me less than half an hour to do.”
H4U1 “We sat and did it together each evening. I’d say we spent about half an
hour at a time.”
The next section of the interviews focused on what they liked and did not like
about the annotation process. All of the households were unhappy with the
amount of time it took to perform the task:
H1U1 “It took way too long and I don’t think I would do it if it wasn’t part of
this study.”
H2U2 “I found it easy to add tags using the who and what buttons, but it still
took too long”
H3U1 “Tagging stuff was boring”
H4U1 “It takes too long, and I don’t know what we would do with it anyway”
Feedback on the Host/Domain tagging interface was mixed:
H1U1 “The site tags are good, I only needed to put them in once and it did the
rest.”
H2U2 “looking through the site was difficult, there were a lot in there, and I
didn’t know what most of it was.”
H4U2 “When tagging site, it was sometimes difficult to decide what to put.
Some places[Web sites] have more than one use ... and going through the
list was time-consuming.”
The mechanism for free user and activity tagging received positive feedback.
Overall the participants stated that it was easy to use:
H1U2 “The quickest way to do it[Annotation], was to look at the search terms
and use the who tool to mark the who it was”
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H2U2 “I found it easy to add tags using the who and what buttons, but it still
took too long”
From the above quotes it can be seen that one member of each household
usually performed the annotation task, asking other family member for help when
needed. Only Household 4 performed the annotation task together. All the
households annotated the data in chunks when they had time and it took between
10 and 30 minutes a day. All households were unhappy with the amount of time
it took to annotate the data.
The host/domain tagging interface was liked by Household 1 as it automati-
cally tagged all traffic from that host/domain after it had been entered. However,
Households 2 and 4 uncovered two problems. Firstly, there were a lot of uniden-
tifiable host/domains in the data. These seemed to be caused by: the structure
of modern websites (content delivery networks and third party tracking tools),
software updates, and other background services running on the local host. This
unidentifiable traffic made the task of adding host/domain tags time-consuming.
Secondly, HomeNetViewer assumed a one-to-one relationship between host/domain
tags and activity and users. However, some host/domain tags have more then
one legitimate use and different users use sites for different activities. This com-
bined with the volume of traffic, particularly traffic that the users could not easily
identify, added to the time it took to perform the annotation task.
Utility of the annotated data. To start discussion around the utility of the
generated visualisations the participants were asked, “Thinking about the visu-
alisations of the annotated data, can you tell me what you found useful?”. In
response to this question all households made comments that highlighted im-
proved visibility of activity on their networks:
H1U1 “It offers a good overview of the usage, I didn’t know how much streaming
H1U3 was doing. We have a 30 Gig cap on our package, so it could be a
problem.”
H2U2 “I was amazed by how much my phone talked to Facebook”
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H3U1 “Its shown me how much time I spend on eBay, I think I might have a
bit of a problem! and I think H3U3 is watching far too much football on
YouTube”
H4U1 “Looking at the how little we use the Internet we should move to a cheaper
provider.”
Household 3 also found the ability to monitor all their devices in one location
useful.
H3U1 “it’s similar to what I can see if I look at the browser history, which I
do from time-to-time. To keep an eye on the kids ... this is easier though,
because I can see it all in one place.”
One household suggested that the increased visibility offered by HomeNetViewer
may lead them to rethink some of the house rules around the use of the Internet
in bedrooms, stating:
H3U1 “We don’t let the kids take computers and phones into their bedrooms.
If they want to use the web they have to do it where we can keep an eye on
them. Having this log of what has happened online might mean we could
be a bit more flexible in future.”
Household 4 did not see any real use for the data. H4U2 said “It’s not that useful
to us. I don’t need to know what [H4U1] is doing on the computer”. This point
of view was also echoed by the younger participant H3U3 who said “Don’t see
the point in it”.
To further prompt discussion around what could be seen in the annotated
data the participants were asked, “Can you look at the data you have collected
and tell me how it relates to your lifestyle?” The following discussions raised three
observations. Firstly the routines of daily life were identifiable by the participants
from the visualisations. They were able to see, and interpret, the ebb and flow
of network activity caused by their household routines.
H1U1 “You can see when [H1U2] gets home, there a lot more going on [the
network].”
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Figure 4.6: An example of the visibility of H2U4s’ daily routine and unknown
traffic at odd times of night
H2U4 “Look at my mobile, you can see when I left for work and when I came
back. Have a look at H2U2’s mobile for me over a week, ... yeah you can
see she leaves for work about 8:30 and gets back around 5 most days.” This
can be seen in Figure 4.6.
The second observation was that automated traffic obscures true user activity.
For example, users in Household 1, 2 and 4 were concerned about activity that
they could not recognise at strange time of the night. An example of the mobile
device that is mentioned below by H2U4 can be seen in Figure 4.6.
H1U1 “This is my phone, but I don’t know why it is claiming to be in Facebook
at 4am, That definitely was not me or anyone else at that time of the night!”
H2U4 “I would like to know, for example, how often I used Facebook, but I
can’t tell because of all the stuff that’s not me.”
H4U2 “It looks like I was using my laptop on Saturday night, but I’m sure we
were at a friends’ house.”
Finally, web browser behaviour and/or configuration can affect the accuracy of
some annotations. The way in which the software used to access the World Wide
Web has been configured can cause some incorrect annotations if Host/Domain
tags are used. The first example of this was noticed by H1U2. They spotted
an interesting discrepancy with the annotations relating to their iPad, “Look
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there, that’s been tagged as mum [H1U4], but I can see that was me”. On closer
inspection the tag for H1U4 had been derived from a Host/Domain user tags,
after discussing it a bit more H1U4 realised that “the iPad goes to the sites you
last had open [when you relaunch the web browser]”.
Another occasion where this was seen in the user data was by H4U2 who
commented, “hummm, it says I’m working a lot more than I would expect, it
looks like I’m working every time I go on the computer”. Closer inspection
revealed that one of the sites that the user had tagged as “Work” was set to open
when the browser was opened. This software/configuration specific behaviour
reduces the accuracy of annotations.
Overall the reaction to the annotated data was positive. All households indi-
cated that the visualisation had enabled them to gain new knowledge about what
had happened on their networks. This shows that HomeNetViewer has achieved
its main goal of improving network legibility. Another interesting finding is that
users’ routines are visible in the traces.
However, the annotation process is not perfect and there are two problems that
affect the clarity and accuracy of the visualisation. Firstly, and most important
is the presence of large amounts of automated traffic. This is traffic not related
directly to user activity, but is caused by a number of automated processes.
Second, some software used to access the Internet has unique and sometimes user
configurable behaviour. This can cause the same network actions to be performed
when they are used regardless of the user. This can lead to the automated user
tags derived from host/domain data to be incorrect.
The language of annotations. One goal of this work was to assess the prac-
ticality of using users and activities as a vocabulary for annotating domestic
network data. To encourage feedback in this area the participants were asked.
“How did you feel about using activities and users to annotate your network
data?” All the households indicated that they were comfortable using this type
of language for this task.
H1U1 “Most of the time it worked [using activities as tags].”
H2U2 “Very practical, How else would you do it?”
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H4U2 “It felt fine, not difficult at all really.”
However, some participants indicated they had some problems using activities in
some cases:
H1U1 “It’s hard to know what to put sometimes, should I group Facebook and
Twitter as Social Media or put them under their own tag?”
H2U2 “I made a mistake early on putting google.com as Search, we use it for
more than that.”
H3U1 “I use Gmail for work, but H3U2 uses it for his private email his work
email is somewhere else.”
The use of activities and users to annotate network data in domestic envi-
ronments was positively received by all of the participating households. They
indicated that using this type of language seems natural and often just worked.
However, there are three difficulties in using this approach. Firstly, not all
host/domains have a one-to-one mapping to user activity. Second, it is diffi-
cult at first to decide whether to use broad or precise language when adding an
annotation. Finally, there is not always a simple relationship between activity
and the sites being visited. This occurred for two reasons: not all users visit a
given site for the same activity and some sites provide many different functions.
Search term data. To explore the utility of, and reaction to, search term
data discussion was prompted with the question, “What do you think about
the search term data, how did you use it?” The answers to this question were
generally positive:
H1U1 “Looking through the search terms is a bit embarrassing. There are loads
of typos, but it makes it very easy to see what I was doing online.”
H2U1 “They[search terms] are very useful, I often used them when adding tags
to confirm what activity was taking place. I could also normally tell who
the user was as well”
90
H4U2 “I like the search data, it’s a bit like a diary. I can look back and see
what I was searching for, which tells me what I was doing.”
However, most of the households also raised concerns over the intrusive nature of
the search term data. Most users were uncomfortable with the level of information
exposed by search terms. The comments regarding this are dealt with next,
alongside the other privacy related concerns.
Privacy. The previous question on dealing with search terms led the users into
a discussion on the privacy related issues of HomeNetViewer. This discussion
was further encouraged by asking, “How did you feel about the extra informa-
tion HomeNetViewer makes visible to the rest of the household?” Generally
the reactions were positive or indifferent towards most of the data exposed by
HomeNetViewer:
H1U1 “The sites and activity is[sic] fine. It’s pretty general.”
H2U1 “I’m happy for the family to see that data. I would not want anyone else
to see it though”
H3U2 “I didn’t mind people seeing which sites I visited. It’s like looking at the
browser history.”
H4U1 “It’s OK, I’m not sure I would look at it if I’m being totally honest.”
However, the search term data proved controversial in all but one household. This
shows some discomfort with the level of information they expose:
H2U3 “I don’t like these[search term data], I don’t mind people knowing I’m
Googling ... but I might be looking up something private”
H3U2 “The search terms give too much away.”
Another interesting point raised in one household was how HomeNetViewer
installation caused discussions around acceptable behaviour on the domestic net-
work:
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H2U1 “Just after you installed it [HomeNetViewer], H2U2 had a chat with me
about what I thought was acceptable ... not that she was doing anything
wrong, she just wanted to make sure.”
This comment is important because it highlights two things. Firstly, the interac-
tion between the visibility of network activities and the negotiation of domestic
network policy. Second, this indicates that some users may have altered their
behaviour once they became aware of the level of transparency HomeNetViewer
offered.
4.4 Discussion
All the participants were able to understand the interactive time-line visualisa-
tion, with little or no training. Additionally, all households provided feedback
demonstrating that they were able to gain new insight into their network us-
age. This indicates that the interactive time-line visualisations are beneficial and
improved domestic network legibility.
HomeNetViewer also shows that it is possible for users to annotate their own
data and that these annotations help to enhance understanding of their network
usage. The combination of interactive time-line visualisation and user contributed
annotations to create user-centred presentations of network activity can be a valu-
able tool for increasing network legibility and supporting self-management of do-
mestic networks. There were several other positive findings from the deployment
of HomeNetViewer.
All of the users in the deployment are comfortable using activities and users
as a vocabulary for annotating domestic network data. This supports the find-
ings of Brundell et al. [18]. However, the deliberately unrestricted text entry
implemented in this version of HomeNetViewer caused some frustration. Par-
ticipants found it difficult to chose the correct scope of the annotation for some
hosts/domains.
All of the participants were comfortable working with host/domain data ex-
tracted from HTTP/S traffic. The host names and domain names of interest were
identifiable in the list of all visited sites. However, a large number of unknown
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hosts/domains were present in the interfaces. These unknown hosts/domains
caused frustration for the participants. The initial design work highlighted this
issues with advertising related traffic. In spite of efforts to filter this out, they
were not 100% effective.
In the final dataset the most prevalent cause of unknown domains related
to the structure of modern web applications. Modern web applications often
use load balancing, content delivery networks, and third party hosted content to
enhance the performance of their applications. This can lead to a large number
of unidentifiable host/domains being listed that appear to be unconnected to the
original site accessed.
A further issue highlighted by the participants related to host/domain annota-
tion, is that some host/domains support multiple activities. The deployed version
of HomeNetViewer only allowed one host/domain annotation per host/domain to
be entered. Allowing multiple annotations per host/domain would be trivial in
the interface, but would cause difficulties in the visualisation. How would the
system choose the correct annotation to display back to the user? One household
also noticed that some hosts/domains mapped to different activities for different
users. How best to deal with these complexities is left as an open question for
future exploration.
The final aspect to discuss is that of respecting privacy and the use of search
term data. The participants in the study were generally happy with other mem-
bers of their household seeing a history of websites they have visited. However,
this was a small sample which may have been skewed to more open households.
A number of households who initially showed an interest in taking part in the
study, declined to participate when they were given more information on the
type of data collected and made visible to the rest of the household. This shows
that concerns about privacy vary between households. Addressing this privacy
issue for a broader population would be a key challenge in taking this type of
technology further.
Search term data were also controversial among the participants. Search term
data were found to be an effective way for participants to identify activities and
users on their networks. They acted as: reminders of events, clues to activities
and clues to users. They were also used extensively by participants to perform the
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annotation process. Search terms are a valuable source of information that can
be used to contextualise network traffic. However, they were deemed intrusive
by many participants as they gave away too much information to the rest of the
household. Most of the privacy related discussions in the exit interviews focused
on the issues surrounding information exposed by search term data.
Overall the HomeNetViewer platform enabled users to gain new insights into
the traffic on their domestic networks. However, there is room for improvement
and several open challenges remain.
The main complaint made by the participants concerned the time taken to
perform the manual annotation task. Reducing the time taken to annotate the
data would be worth investigating in future. The annotation task itself was time
consuming. Having to examine the each device on the network in turn and look
through periods of high activity was tedious. A number of participants noted
that the unidentifiable traffic in the interfaces also slowed down the annotation
process.
The HomeNetViewer system removed a significant proportion of advertising
traffic using domain blacklisting, in an attempt to remove unknown hosts/domains
from the interface. Unfortunately, this was not 100% effective as some advertis-
ing related traffic was still visible in the annotation interfaces. Another source
of automated traffic observed was from software and operating system updates.
This type of automated traffic was seen on most types of devices.
The traffic caused by software and operating system updates did not adversely
affect the visualisations, because users chose not to annotate this type of traffic.
It did, however, clutter the annotation interfaces. The design and implementa-
tion practices of modern web applications also contributed to the high levels of
unknown host/domains in the annotation interfaces. How to reduce the impact
of these factors on manual data annotation remains unresolved.
The polling behaviours of modern web applications and mobile phone apps
caused some annoyance and frustration to the users in the study when combined
with host/domain annotations. Websites and apps like Facebook, Twitter and
many more exhibit this type of behaviour, which leads to sites being reported as
in-use even if the user was not actively using the device. The ability to distinguish
between user generated and automated polling for updates would be beneficial
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to the understanding of the visualisations and reduce the amount of unknown
hosts/domains in the annotation interfaces.
The last aspect worth discussing were the technical problems encountered
during the deployment of HomeNetViewer. Most devices worked well with Home-
NetViewer and after installation no households reported any problems. However,
a number of devices encountered during the installation had problems with trans-
parent SSL proxies “in the wild”. These devices fell into three categories,
The first set of devices did not respect the certificates in the devices key store
for certain apps. For example, Android phones did not use the device key store
when accessing Google services such as the Google Play store. The Apple iPhone
had similar restrictions in place for accessing the Apple app store and a num-
ber of banking applications were also affected. These restrictions stopped the
participants from installing new apps on their mobile devices or using specific
applications while connected to the HomeNetViewer enabled router. These re-
strictions were likely put in-place by the App developers to stop MITM attacks
on the SSL traffic as they contain sensitive information.
The second set of devices did not offer a way to configure the internal device
keychain and were unable to be configured to accept HomeNetViewer’s SSL cer-
tificate. These were all consumer grade devices, designed for accessing media over
the Internet. For example, Roku media streamer. These devices still provided
useful information as HomeNetViewer was designed to cache the forward DNS
lookup, which enabled the IP addresses in the HTTPS headers to be converted
to relevant hostnames, which were then displayed to the users in the interface.
The third and final class of devices had some form of proxy detection to pre-
vent the caching of the data they receive. These included the Sky+HD receiver,
Sky Now TV box, and the PlayStation 4. These devices refused to function when
the Squid proxy was enabled. There was no option other than to exclude these
devices from the study. This was achieved by reconnecting them back to the
households original router so they would remain functional. This meant that no
data were collected from these devices.
The above problems show that using a transparent HTTP/S proxy with SSL
interception is not currently a viable option for deploying this type of system in
domestic environments. This means the extraction of full URLs and search term
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data is not practical for deployment in real environments. Interestingly, this may
help with debate surrounding the use of search term data, but it also removes a
useful source of information used in the annotation process. How removing search
term data would affect both these issues would require further investigation. Next
we discuss the limitations of this work.
4.5 Limitations
Recruiting participants for this study was particularly difficult. This is reflected
in the small number of deployments. While every effort was made to recruit a
wide range of households it was not possible to find a single person or multiple oc-
cupancy household, for example, a student house or house of young professionals
to include. Multiple occupancy households would have been of particular interest
as it has been reported that sharing Internet connections in these environments
can cause tension between the house-mates [20]. It would have also be interest-
ing to see if there were differences in the privacy sensitivity between family and
multiple occupancy households.
Related to the difficulty in recruiting participants is the possibility of introduc-
ing self-selection bias. It was only possible to recruit households who were happy
for all members of the household to have access to each others’ online activity.
Hence, the families that volunteered are likely to have a more relaxed attitude to
their online privacy within the family unit than the general population.
Another limitation to consider is whether the increased visibility provided by
HomeNetViewer have caused the participants to alter their behaviour. Household
1 reported a conversation regarding “what was deemed acceptable behaviour”
shortly after HomeNetviewer was installed. It is unclear which activities, or by
how much, the participants may have modified their behaviour and so it is difficult
to estimate its impact, if any, on the results. If behaviour change did occur it is
likely that it was in a small number of activities deemed unacceptable by that
particular family. Hence, we hypothesise this effect will not significantly impact
the data collected as the majority of online activities do not fall into this category.
It was also not possible to collect all data from all devices in the participating
households due to the incompatibility of some devices with the transparent Squid
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proxy and SSL bump module. A number of media devices and games consoles had
to be removed from the deployments. Hence, we did not capture representative
traffic from these device types.
The exit interviews were performed as a household group. It therefore was
difficult to engage all the participants. The younger participants presented par-
ticular difficulties as they seemed unwilling to speak openly while their parents
were present. This may have led to the feedback from participants being skewed
to the views of the adults in some households.
The deployment of HomeNetViewer has shown that user-centred presentations
of domestic network data are useful domestic to users and increases domestic
network legibility. It has also raised some interesting challenges. The main issue
raised by the participants was the time taken to perform the manual annotation
of the data. The next section of this dissertation looks at using enterprise traffic
classification techniques to reduce the annotation burden.
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Chapter 5
Automatic generation of
user-centred presentations of
network activity from IP Flow
records
The deployment of HomeNetViewer, described in Chapter 4, highlights the need
to reduce the annotation burden on users. In this chapter, one approach to reduce
the annotation burden is explored.
A number of possible approaches to this problem are highlighted in section 2.6
of the literature review. Due to the recent move towards HTTPS as the default
protocol, and the difficulty in deploying a transparent SSL proxy in the home,
methods that require deep packet inspection are ruled out. Hence, enterprise traf-
fic classification techniques that use IP Flow records as the feature vectors are
considered. These have been shown to be effective in classifying traffic in com-
mercial environments to improve network legibility for networking professionals.
Enterprise traffic classification techniques work by automatically grouping traf-
fic into classes based on the statistical properties of the IP Flows. The classes
used in enterprise traffic classification are based around network protocol. This
is different to the classes in the HomeNetViewer dataset [18]. Each class in the
HomeNetViewer dataset contains traffic from a number of protocols and there
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is no direct relationship between class and protocol. This chapter explores the
following question:
Q4.0 Can enterprise traffic classification techniques be used with user contributed
annotations to automatically annotate domestic network traffic?
The data collected in Chapter 4 enables the generation of an annotated IP
Flow dataset. Using this it is possible to formulate two multi-class classification
problems, similar to those described in the traffic classification literature. In the
first case, the target classes are the users and the input features are the data
contained within the IP Flow records. In the second case, the target classes are
the activities and the input features are the data contained within the IP Flow
records.
The rest of this chapter focuses on the analysis of the HomeNetViewer dataset.
This dataset is used to assess the viability of enterprise traffic classification tech-
niques in domestic environments. The performance of various classifiers and the
importance of the available feature vectors are explored. Next, the important
terms are defined.
5.1 Performance metrics
The performance of machine learning classifiers is typically quantified using the
standard metrics: precision, recall, and F1-measure [12]. To understand these
metrics it is first important to define four terms:
True Positive measures the number of positives that are correctly identified as
positives.
True Negative measures the number of negatives that are correctly identified
as negatives.
False Positive measures the number of negatives that are incorrectly identified
as positives.
False Negative measures the number of positives that are incorrectly identified
as negatives.
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In the literature these are also commonly discussed in terms of type I and type
II errors. These are defined as:
Type I is the incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis, equivalent to a false
positive.
Type II is failure to reject a false null hypothesis, equivalent to a false negative.
Now that the basic terminology has been defined, the performance metrics used
in this chapter can be defined.
Precision: for a particular class, this is defined as the ratio of True Positives
to the sum of the True Negatives and False Positives, see 5.1.
Precision =
TruePositives
(TrueNegatives + FalsePositives)
(5.1)
The closer the value is to one, the lower the number of type I errors committed
by the classifier.
Recall: for a particular class, this is defined as the ratio of True Positives to
the sum of the True Positives and False Negatives, shown in 5.2
Recall =
TruePositives
(TruePositives + FalseNegatives)
(5.2)
The closer the value is to one, the lower the number of type II errors are committed
by the classifier.
F1-measure: this weights both precision and recall into one metric, by taking
their harmonic mean, shown in 5.3.
F1−measure = 2
(
Precision ∗Recall
Precision + Recall
)
(5.3)
Higher values of F1-measure indicate better overall classifier performance.
In this chapter the results are presented per-class using the above metrics
for both user and activity classification tasks. When presenting the Precision,
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Recall, and F1-measure the support values are also provided. This is defined as:
the number of occurrences of each class labelled in the validation dataset.
Alongside these numerical values a normalised confusion matrix is also dis-
played. The confusion matrix visualises classification errors. A normalised confu-
sion matrix is used to account for the differing number of members of each class.
Next, the HomeNetViewer dataset is described including its feature vectors and
target classes.
5.2 Dataset and classes
The dataset used in this work is taken from the deployment of HomeNetViewer in
4 real UK households. Details of the deployment and data collection can be seen
in Chapter 4. An IP flow is defined as “a set of IP packets passing an Observation
Point in the network during a certain time interval. All packets belonging to a
particular Flow have a set of common properties.” [21]. In this dataset, the
Observation Point is the household Access Point. An IP flow in its most basic
form is described as a tuple containing: the source and destination IP address,
source and destination ports, protocol type and duration. However, it can be
augmented with any number of other properties, for example, packet inter-arrival
time or payload size Moore et al. identify 249 possibilities [60]. The structure of
the data collected by the HomeNetViewer platform is shown in Table 5.1.
The data were not collected or annotated with the intention of testing enter-
prise traffic classification techniques. Hence, the full headers of each packet were
not collected. This limits the analysis, as the raw data are not available to cal-
culate many of the feature vectors suggested by Moore et al. [60]. Therefore, the
analysis is limited to the data collected by the HomeNetViewer platform. Irre-
spective of this, the data collected contain enough information for basic analysis.
The annotations used to generate the ground truth are provided by real users,
making this a reasonably realistic scenario.
Before the data analysis could be performed the IP Flow data had to be
processed through the following four steps. Firstly, the appropriate flows had
to be selected from the HomeNetViewer database. IP Flows on all ports were
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Field Description
macaddr MAC address of the local device
dir The flow direction
proto The flows protocol type
saddr The IP address of the source
sport The port for the source
daddr The IP address of the destination
dport The port for the destination
npkts The number of packets in the flow
nbytes The number of bytes sent through the flow
startTime The time the IP Flow started in ms since the Unix epoch
endTime The time the IP Flow ended in ms
duration Length of flow in ms
Table 5.1: Description of the Flow data collected
selected between the start and end of the three week deployment. All IP Flows
going between hosts on the local network were excluded from the dataset.
Second, three new compound features were calculated for each flow. Each one
is described in turn below.
Flow delta is the elapsed time since an IP Flow on the same port from the same
source and destination was seen on a particular device. The feature was
created to capture the timing between similar events. The time between
events may vary due to user routines/characteristics, activity characteristics
and the type of data being delivered.
Packet rate is defined as the number of packets in an IP Flow divided by the
length in seconds of the IP Flow. This feature was selected as it may
show activity specific properties, for example, the difference between video
streaming and web browsing.
Average packet bytes is defined as the total number of bytes sent through an
IP Flow divided by the number of packets in the IP Flow. This feature
was calculated as it may highlight the difference between some activities,
for example, video streaming or audio streaming.
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In the third step, the user generated annotations are used to attach ground
truth to each IP Flow in the dataset. Each annotation contains the MAC address
of a device and a time-stamp of the start and end of the annotation. Assigning
ground truth was achieved by iterating through all the flows and looking for an
annotation that has a matching MAC address and a start time-stamp, between
the start and end time of the annotation. Any IP Flow that did not meet this
criteria was assigned to the Unknown class. This process was performed twice
for each household. Once for the user annotations and once for the activity
annotations. This generates two datasets per household.
The fourth, and final step, was to split the datasets for each household into
a training and validation set. Data from the first week was used as the training
set and the final two weeks were used as the validation set. The following nam-
ing convention is used when referring to datasets: Household [1:4], annotation
type[U,A], data type [T,V]. For example, H1AV is the verification set for House-
hold one’s activity annotations and H3UT is Household three’s user annotation
training set.
5.3 Classification algorithm and feature selec-
tion
A number of classification algorithms are commonly used for enterprise traffic
classification, see section 2.6. Recent work in fine-grained traffic classification
focusing on HTTP/S traffic has shown decision tree based Random Forest clas-
sifiers perform well on IP Flow data [36]. However, this work focuses on an
enterprise focused set of target classes. Each algorithm also has its own strengths
and weaknesses, depending on the properties of the dataset. Therefore, to achieve
best performance it is important to test, and select, the algorithm most appro-
priate for the problem. In this section the performance of five classification algo-
rithms are tested: k-Nearest Neighbours (K-NN), Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB),
Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB), Decision tree (DT) and Random Forest (RF)
and Support Vector Machines (SVM). All algorithms used were provided by the
Scikit-learn toolkit in python [66].
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The k -fold cross-validation methodology is used to estimate the performance
of each classifier. k -fold cross-validation take the training dataset and splits it
into k chunks, or folds. Each fold is then used as a validation set once, with the
remaining k − 1 folds used to create a training set.
k -fold cross-validation is often used to estimate classifier performance, as it
eliminates bias introduced through the selection of the training and validation
datasets [48]. The number of folds used in this experiment was ten.
For each algorithm it is also important to select the correct set of features
to optimise performance. As only ten features are available all are exhaustively
tested. The features were ranked using the ANOVA F-value statistic, which
measures the dependency between the feature and the classes.
Before the algorithms were tested the data were pre-processed. Two processes
were applied. Firstly, all non-numeric features were converted to numerical values.
This is important as not all classifiers can handle non-numeric data. The features
converted in this dataset were MAC address and IP address that were converted
to their respective integer forms. Second, scaling was applied to all features.
The scaling stops the wide range of values in raw data skewing the results of the
objective functions.
For each classification algorithm a k -fold cross-validation was performed on
the H1UT and H1AT datasets for each classifier with the features added one-
by-one in rank order, according to the ANOVA F-value. The results for the
user classification and activity classification can be seen in Figures 5.1 and 5.2
respectively.
It can be seen in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 that the tree based classifiers perform
best on both datasets, supporting the findings of Grimaudo et al. [36]. The
SVM classifier required CPU and memory capacity beyond those available, due
to the large number of data points and classes. It did not finish within 24 hours,
so it was excluded. Classifiers that rely on the underlying statistical properties
of the data, such as, GNB and MNB, performed poorly in both classification
tasks. Hence, the Random Forest classifier was chosen to complete the final data
analysis.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 also show the impact of each feature vector on the classifier
performance. It can be seen, in both cases, that the performance of the Random
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Figure 5.1: Classifier performance H1UT dataset
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Figure 5.2: Classifier performance H1AT dataset
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Forest classifier increases steadily until the sixth feature is added. After that the
improvement begins to level off. For this reason, only the best six features are
considered for the rest of the analysis.
After the selection of the Random Forest classifier and the six best features,
the available parameters can now be optimised. The Scikit-learn implementation
has two parameters that are related to the accuracy of the resulting classifier.
The first is the number of estimators, which is the maximum number of trees in
the forest. The second is the criterion, used to measure the quality of the split
at each branch. Scikit-learn offers two criteria, Gini impurity and entropy. Gini
impurity is a measure of how frequently a randomly selected element from the
data would be incorrectly labelled if it were randomly labelled according to the
distribution of labels in the data. Entropy is information gain. Figures 5.3 and
5.4 show the results of a grid search of these parameters used to find their optimal
values.
The graphs show, in both user and activity classification, that the entropy
split criterion out performs Gini impurity. In the user classification task, classifier
performance improves up to 100 estimators and then levels off. In the activity
classification task, classifier performance improves up to 60 estimators and then
levels off. Therefore, 100 and 60 were used as the number of estimators for the
user and activity classifiers respectively.
After finding the best performing classifier and optimising its parameters on
the H1UT and H1AT datasets, the next step is to assess the performance of the
classifier on all the data collected from each household, using training sets to
train the classifier and the verification set to assess its performance. The results
of this process are presented in the next section.
5.4 Results
This section presents the results generated by testing the Random Forest classifier.
Using the parameters found in the previous section for both the user and activity
recognition tasks. These results were obtained by training the classifier on the
first week’s data for each household. The remaining two weeks’ data are then
used to assess classification performance. For the user classification task a full
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mators
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Number of estimators
0.775
0.780
0.785
0.790
0.795
0.800
0.805
0.810
C
ro
ss
 v
a
lid
a
ti
o
n
 s
co
re
gini
entropy
Figure 5.4: Classifier performance H1AT dataset with increasing number of esti-
mators
107
set of precision, recall and F1-measure, and confusion matrices are provided. For
the activity classification task, the same metrics are presented on a subset of the
available classes. Since not all activity classes have examples in the training and
verification datasets, calculating the required metrics is impossible.
Before going further it is worth discussing one important feature of the dataset:
the presence of unlabelled data. The annotation process used in HomeNetViewer
leads to a large proportion, approximately 50%, of the data being unlabelled.
These data are assigned to the Unknown class. Within the Unknown class there
will be a mix of traffic. Some will be unrelated to users and activities. However,
the annotation method is not 100% accurate. Users are fallible, and all not all
user traffic has been annotated. An example of this can be seen in Figure 4.4.
Therefore, the traffic labelled as Unknown will contain a mix of user and none
user traffic. This is important to consider when reviewing the results presented
below. The metrics used will treat any flow with an Unknown label that is
classified as user traffic, to be a false positive. Unfortunately this is not the
always the case, because the annotation method is not 100% accurate. This
effectively increases the number of false positives reducing the reported precision
value and consequently the F1-measure.
No realistic way to compensate for this issue could be found. Therefore, two
values for the precision and F-measure are calculated. The pessimistic/standard
value that underestimates classifier performance and an optimistic values that
over estimates classifier performance. The optimistic values are calculated by
treating false positives with the Unknown class as true positives. These values
provide a range, within which, the true value lies. Both values are displayed in
the tables. The pessimistic/standard value is shown first, with the optimistic
value in brackets.
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5.4.1 Household 1
precision recall f1-measure support
Unknown 0.52 0.73 0.60 208219
user 1 0.42 (0.79) 0.55 0.48 (0.65) 32249
user 2 0.48 (0.81) 0.29 0.36 (0.43) 92197
user 3 0.08 (0.48) 0.03 0.05 (0.6) 23795
user 4 0.36 (0.84) 0.10 0.15 (0.18) 57815
avg / total 0.46 (0.73) 0.49 0.45 (0.59) 414275
Table 5.2: H1UV classification results, optimistic precision shown in ()
precision recall f1-measure support
cloud storage 0.83 0.60 0.69 18892
cooking reciepes[sic] 0.00 0.00 0.00 254
design work 0.00 0.00 0.00 6
email 0.00 0.00 0.00 44
fitness 0.00 0.00 0.00 6
leisure 0.24 0.02 0.04 8540
leisure info 0.91 0.59 0.72 32660
movie info 0.00 0.00 0.00 24
music info 0.00 0.00 0.00 39144
music work 0.01 0.01 0.01 110
school work 0.00 0.00 0.00 384
shopping 0.01 0.04 0.01 2114
social networking 0.00 0.23 0.00 194
Unknown 0.23 0.33 0.27 7960
web searching 0.98 0.01 0.03 65234
work 0.00 0.00 0.00 12
Table 5.3: H1AV classification results
User Classification results for Household 1 are shown in 5.2. It can be
seen that the classifier has mixed performance. For user 1 the classifier performs
well with F-measures between 0.48 and 0.65. However, for users 2, 3, and 4
the classifier performs much worse achieving F1-measures below 0.43. The recall
for users 3 and 4 is also very low. This means that most of the traffic in the
verification set for users 3 and 4 was missed by the classifier. The confusion
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Figure 5.5: H1UV confusion matrix
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Figure 5.6: H1AV confusion matrix
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matrix in Figure 5.5 shows that for users 1 and 2 there is little or no confusion
between traffic from other users, only in the Unknown class. However, for user 3
and 4 there is visible confusion between them and other users.
Activity classification for Household 1 is disappointing, almost all the ac-
tivities are not correctly classified by the classifier. For the classes that do report
some correct classification (cloud storage, leisure, leisure info, social network-
ing, and web searching) the confusion matrix in Figure 5.6 shows that there is
widespread confusion between the classes. However, three of the classes show
interesting features:
social networking is confused with almost all other classes. There are two
possible explanations for this. Firstly, social media sites are pervasive on
the web, and are often integrated into other site using “Like and share”
buttons. Second, social media sites when open in a browser, or an App is
installed on a device, will periodically poll for new updates. This periodic
polling occurs in the background of other activities. Hence, social media
traffic may have been mislabelled. It is possible that both of these features
contribute to the confusion of the “social networking” class.
cloud storage is often confused with the “design work” and “music work” classes.
It is possible that the use of a cloud storage service is related to the “de-
sign work” and “music work” activities, for sharing files with colleagues or
storage of backups.
music info is not detected by the classifier at all in the H1AV data set, in spite
of the high support value. Closer inspection of the raw data reveals that
the sites annotated in the training set as “music info” are different to the
sites labelled in the verification set. This indicates that the training set has
not captured all the user behaviour.
5.4.2 Household 2
User Classification in Household 2 was complicated by the return of user 2
from university after the first week of the study had elapsed. This means that
user 2 has no data in the H2UT dataset. It was decided to leave the data for user
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Figure 5.7: H2UV confusion matrix
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Figure 5.8: H2AV confusion matrix
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precision recall f1-measure support
Unknown 0.28 0.47 0.35 42699
user 1 0.68 (0.93) 0.63 0.66 (0.75) 61838
user 2 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 39470
user 3 0.51 (0.57) 0.68 0.58 (0.62) 31793
user 4 0.35 (0.49) 0.46 0.40 (0.47) 12085
avg / total 0.40 (0.50) 0.46 0.42 (0.48) 187885
Table 5.4: H2UV classification results, optimistic precision shown in ()
precision recall f1-measure support
shopping 0.55 0.00 0.00 6231
Unknown 0.08 0.00 0.00 26916
watching tv 0.63 0.68 0.65 3523
work 0.00 0.00 0.00 361
Table 5.5: H2AV classification results
2 in the dataset to see how data from a new user joining the network affects the
classifier. As expected user 2 is never correctly identified by the classifier and is
misclassified as user 3 and user 4. This highlights that the social make-up of the
household is dynamic and changing, and these changes can affect classification
accuracy. The remaining users in the household were well classified. User 1 was
only ever confused with traffic in the Unknown class with a precision between
68% and 93%. The confusion matrix in Figure 5.7 show there is some confusion
between user 3 and user 2, and user 4 and user 1.
Activity classification results for household 2 are disappointing. Only one
class, watching TV, achieved a positive F-1 measure. The recall values of zero
(two decimal places) for shopping and work are due to a large number of False
Negatives, i.e. examples that were missed by the classifier. This shows that the
classifier could not properly identify examples from those classes in the validation
set. This could be for two possible reasons. Firstly, the examples in the training
set are not representative of the examples in the validation set. For example, the
shopping that was labelled in the training occurred on site A and the shopping
in labelled verification set occurred on site B. The second explanation is that
the feature vectors do not provide enough information to distinguish between the
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classes. However, where the classifier was able to correctly identify the activity,
watching TV, there was no confusion except with the Unknown class.
5.4.3 Household 3
precision recall f1-measure support
Unknown 0.81 0.66 0.73 145001
user 1 0.60 (0.97) 0.90 0.72 (0.93) 79469
user 2 0.80 (0.99) 0.33 0.47 (0.49) 17376
user 3 0.76 (0.97) 0.51 0.61 (0.67) 12492
avg / total 0.74 (0.98) 0.71 0.70 (0.82) 254338
Table 5.6: H3UV classification results, optimistic precision shown in ()
precision recall f1-measure support
football 0.42 0.58 0.49 21478
gaming 0.16 0.35 0.22 4740
organising day out 0.01 0.45 0.02 757
selling items 0.41 0.62 0.50 39387
Unknown 0.43 0.53 0.47 7101
Table 5.7: H3AV classification results
User Classifications for Household 3 provides the best results for the user
classification task. This is indicated by the presence of a strong diagonal in
Figure 5.9 and the high average F1-measure between (0.70 and 0.82) in Table 5.6.
It can be seen from Figure 5.9 that there is a small amount confusion between
user 3 and user 1.
Activity classification in Household 3 was the best in the group with two
classes with F1-measures approaching 0.5. However, there is still significant con-
fusion between all classes.
5.4.4 Household 4
User Classification in Household 4 is disappointing given that it has only two
classes. It can be seen in Figure 5.11 that Users 1 and 2 are not often confused.
However, there is significant confusion with the Unknown class.
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Figure 5.9: H3UV confusion matrix
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precision recall f1-measure support
Unknown 0.76 0.53 0.62 48711
user 1 0.46 (0.82) 0.54 0.49 (0.65) 12254
user 2 0.35 (0.95) 0.67 0.46 (0.78) 13928
avg / total 0.63 (0.89) 0.56 0.57 (0.68) 74893
Table 5.8: H4UV classification results, optimistic precision shown in ()
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Figure 5.11: H4UV confusion matrix
Activity classification in Household 4 was omitted as there were no classes
with sufficient support, available in both the training and validation datasets.
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5.5 Discussion
The dataset used in this chapter is challenging to analyse with enterprise traffic
classification techniques. The first challenge is the incomplete labelling of the
data. A large proportion of data assigned to the Unknown class, which may
contain real user generated traffic. This makes reporting the accuracy of the
techniques difficult. However, it can be seen from the confusion matrices that in
Household 3 reasonably good classification was achieved with a mean F1-measure
of between 0.70 and 0.82.
This work considers each flow in isolation and attempts to assign it to a class,
imitating the enterprise traffic classification techniques. This may not be the
best tactic for users and activity classification in domestic environments. The IP
Flows present within domestic environments cannot all be uniquely attributed
to a user or/and activity. Some IP Flows will look identical, if requested on the
same device, even if they are requested by different people. For example, DNS
requests for the same domain or background images in websites. Only a small
proportion of the IP Flows may be uniquely attributable to a particular user
or activity. This is likely to be a contributing factor to the generally low recall
observed across all households.
Another issue highlighted by this analysis is that the dynamic nature of the
domestic environment can cause problems with classification performance. For
example, adding a new device or a child returning from University. This type of
change would need a different approach with the classifier being updated regularly.
An online machine learning based strategy would be an appropriate technique to
explore [11].
Classification performance for activities was poor in all households. Signifi-
cant misclassification can be seen between classes in all confusion matrices. In
only one or two instances were the classes reliably identified. The activity classi-
fication for Household 1 shows an interesting aspect of the activity classification.
Some activities, that are strongly related or occur concurrently, can confuse the
classifier. The likely cause of this is the mislabelling of IP flows due to the anno-
tation to class label conversion step when assigning user annotations to flows.
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In both the user classification and activity classification tasks the device MAC
address was the most important feature. This suggests that there is a strong
relationship between users, devices and, activities (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). The
amount of device sharing in a household will affect the classification performance.
Overall the direct application of enterprise traffic classification techniques to
the HomeNetViewer dataset was disappointing. However, it shows some promise
and opens up interesting questions for further research. To truly test the perfor-
mance of a supervised learning approach, on this type of data, a new annotation
method would need to be developed, that enabled IP flows to be annotated more
accurately. The approach taken to assign labels to flows in this work has two prob-
lems. Firstly, it assumes all flows occurring on a device when a user is actively
using it belong to them. This may not be the case, due to automated activi-
ties such as software updates and polling applications. Second, a large number
of flows are unlabelled or incorrectly labelled. This makes assessing the classifi-
cation performance difficult. How one could build a better annotation method,
without over burdening the user, would be an interesting challenge to explore.
An area where this work could be improved would be to look at better feature
engineering. The features used here were the minimum available. There are many
more per-flow features that could be explored, with a more complete dataset. A
second approach would be to explore calculating new features for groups of flows
and using them as the input to the classification algorithms.
Furthermore, the techniques used in enterprise traffic classification are not the
only machine learning techniques that may be useful in this domain. Machine
learning is a large discipline, with many tools and techniques for dealing with dif-
ferent problems. There is the possibility of exploring semi-supervised approaches
to deal with the misclassified Unknown data. Another approach would be to
explore the use of an online stream learning algorithm [11]. This is where the
learning algorithm is able to interactively query the user for further information
to assist in the classification process.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Key lessons
6.1.1 User-centred mechanisms for domestic network in-
frastructure control
MultiNet was designed to address the problems with Wi-Fi device association in
domestic environments. The user-centred design process applied was successful
in achieving this objective. The process undertaken allowed the benefits of Out-
of-Band communication channels to be implemented in a way that integrates into
the domestic context. The lab based usability evaluation of MultiNet has shown it
to be more usable than the currently deployed usable association method, WPS.
Three wider lessons that can be drawn from the exploration of user-centred
mechanisms for domestic network infrastructure control. These address the over-
arching question: how should domestic networks be reinvented to support self-
management by domestic users?
Firstly, reinventing the device association process for domestic environments
did not require re-engineering the underlying protocols. Relatively small changes
in the high-level implementations enabled the creation of a vastly different user
interaction and Wi-Fi device association mechanism. The complex underlying
communication and security protocols were untouched, significantly reducing the
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complexity of the modifications. This shows that reinventing the domestic net-
work infrastructure may not always be a significant engineering task.
Second, exploiting the home context is beneficial. For example, in the case
of MultiNet, the physical security of the home was leveraged to provide a threat
model that domestic users could understand, and a simple consistent user inter-
action. The domestic environment has many rituals and routines that may be
worth exploring to address other issues.
Finally, providing an interface as a single point of management for domestic
networks is beneficial. Our participants found using a mobile device to interact
with the network infrastructure simple and intuitive. This supports the findings
of other work [20, 95], but expanded it beyond situated displays onto mobile
devices. Additionally, the Network Controller may enable a number of other
domestic networking issues to be solved, by using the new interaction capabilities
offered by this new piece of infrastructure.
6.1.2 User-centred presentations of network activity
The deployment of HomeNetViewer was successful in its primary goal, increas-
ing domestic network legibility. Applying a user-centred design process enabled
the creation of a usable interactive network data visualisation and annotation
platform. The user-centred design process provided focus, when building the
prototype interfaces. This focus on the annotation process helped narrow down
the relevant data to show to the users in the interfaces. The task of annotating
network data was achieved by all participants with little or no training. This
shows that interactive time-line visualisations are appropriate for visualising do-
mestic network data. Also, all participants made comments that showed that
HomeNetViewer increased their knowledge of the activities occurring on their
networks.
The most informative data available to the domestic access point for use in the
annotation process were the search term data. Search term data are, however,
difficult to obtain and raised privacy concerns. The host and domain names
extracted from the HTTP headers and DNS request were also informative and
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useful in the annotation process, with the DNS request being the easiest and most
reliably captured.
Participants were comfortable using hosts and domains to annotate data.
They could identify hosts and domains they were familiar with and assign the
appropriate activities in most cases. Some hosts and domains were also found
to have strong relationships with certain users. These relationships were obvi-
ous to other members of the household. This tallies with the finding of Brundel
et al., who found users reason about their network usage in terms of activities,
application, and users [18].
Overall the deployment of HomeNetViewer shows that user-centred presenta-
tions of network activity improve network legibility. However, HomeNetViewer
is not perfect, and several open challenges that are discussed in Section 6.2.
6.1.3 Automatic generation of User-centred presentations
from IP Flow records
The work undertaken on improving domestic network legibility through user-
centred presentations of network activity, found that the manual annotation pro-
cess was time consuming. All of the participants commented that the annotation
process took too long.
A number of factors that negatively impact on annotation time are discussed in
Section 4.4. Chapter 5 looked at addressing the annotation burden, by applying
enterprise traffic classification techniques to domestic traffic in an attempt to
answer the question: can enterprise traffic classification techniques be used with
user contributed annotations to automatically annotate domestic network traffic?
Initial data analysis shows that the tree based classifiers perform best on the
HomeNetViewer dataset, with the Random Forest classifier performing best in
both user and activity classification tasks. This is in keeping with the findings of
Grimaudo [36].
This work shows that automatic generation user annotations by directly apply-
ing enterprise traffic classification techniques is challenging. While the classifier
was better than random guessing, there was significant confusion between users
in all households. For the automatic generation of activity annotations the results
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were less encouraging. Even after the activities with good support in both the
training and validation sets were chosen, the classifier still struggled to accurately
classify traffic into activities.
However, it is worth noting that this was a particularly challenging dataset. It
was manually annotated by unskilled users, and was not specifically collected to
support a machine learning based approach. Large sections of the dataset were
not annotated and the coverage of actual user activity is not complete. This,
combined with inaccuracy introduced by transferring time-based annotations to
the IP Flow data, made the classification task more difficult, reducing the overall
reported F1-measures.
6.2 Open challenges
6.2.1 User-centred mechanisms for domestic network in-
frastructure control
The introduction of the network controller by MultiNet was well received by
the participants. The network controller, in this case, was a mobile phone that
offers rich interaction capabilities. The extra interaction capabilities opens new
possibilities in designing interactions with the domestic network infrastructure.
Exploring these further could prove fruitful.
6.2.2 User-centred presentations of network activity
This work has left several open changes, and directions for future research. Firstly,
how to reduce the annotation time for users is an open question. Would better
interfaces or an automated traffic classification approach be the better solution?
Or possibly a combination of the two? User-centred presentations of network
activity have clear benefits, but unless a more efficient annotation method can
be found wider adoption is unlikely.
The second challenge is how to leverage the information within search term
data without exposing sensitive information? The search term data were a valu-
able source of information. Some users relied on it to perform the annotation
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task. However, most of the participants in the deployment were unhappy at the
level of information that it exposed, even to close family members. Removing
the search term data from the interfaces would make annotation even more time
consuming, further burdening the users.
The third, challenge is the identification and removal of automated traf-
fic and device/application specific behaviours. The automated traffic and de-
vice/application specific behaviours cluttered the interfaces and reduced the ef-
fectiveness of HomeNetViewer in two ways. One, it clutters the visualisations
obscuring true user activity. Two, it clutters the annotation interfaces, increas-
ing the time taken to process the list of visited hosts. Fully addressing this
challenge would improve the user experience and also the quality of the resulting
annotations.
Finally, the one-to-one mapping between users and activities and domains
is insufficient in some cases. Not only do some host/domains have multiple ac-
tivities, but the reason for visiting the host/domain could be user dependent.
Improvements to the annotation interface to take into account websites with
multiple activities and users with differing activities would be a challenging issue
to address.
6.2.3 Automatic generation of User-centred presentations
from IP Flow records
This work has outlined three open challenges. Firstly, exploring improved ma-
chine learning techniques for processing human annotated network datasets. The
machine learning techniques, used in enterprise traffic classification, were built
around fully annotated datasets. They do not need to cope with missing data
and/or evolving behaviours. Classifying domestic traffic using user generated
annotations is different. The presence of unknown data, mislabelled data and
rapidly changing behaviour patterns due the ebb and flow of daily life. Creating
a system to deal with these factors is a significant challenge.
Second, the development of more accurate IP flow annotation platforms for
domestic environments. Improving the machine learning techniques applied is
one way forward. Another possible avenue to explore would be to improve the
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annotation interfaces, specifically focusing on improving the accuracy of IP flow
annotations.
Finally, one important question that remains is how accurate do the automatic
classification of network traffic need to be to support the self-management by
users? To provide useful information to domestic users 100% accuracy may not
be required. Interfaces that express the confidence that a particular activity was
performed by a particular user could be good enough to support local negotiation
of domestic network policy.
6.3 Next steps
MultiNet and HomeNetViewer demonstrate that reinventing the domestic net-
work infrastructure taking a user-centred design approach has a positive impact
on domestic Wi-Fi device association and network legibility. The two case studies
show that the application of user-centred design approach to domestic network
redesign produces usable solutions to these specific problems. However, this dis-
sertation only addressed two particular issues with domestic networks. Further
work is required to explore user-centred solutions for other aspects of domestic
network management and configuration.
This dissertation leaves several interesting future challenges regarding the pro-
cessing of data passing through domestic access points. The main complaint
made by participants regarding the use of HomeNetViewer was the time taken to
perform the annotation task. The application of enterprise traffic classification
techniques shows some promise.
However, the techniques currently used do not handle the HomeNetViewer
dataset well. This leaves two angles to explore in future work. Firstly, building
interfaces specifically designed to annotate IP flow data more accurately. Second,
the exploration of better machine learning techniques that are designed to cope
with this type of dataset. One possibility would be to use an online stream learn-
ing approach [11]. This has the benefit of engaging the user in the classification
process and constantly updates its model for each new sample received.
The second challenge is how to use the data passing through domestic access
points in a way the domestic users are comfortable with. The amount of informa-
124
tion exposed to other householders was problematic. Once again the application
of machine learning techniques may also help address these privacy issues. This
would require the collection of many annotated datasets to enable development of
algorithms to identify activities that are universally identifiable between house-
holds. Automation of the annotation process would reduce, or remove altogether,
the need to expose the underlying data for annotation by the user.
As households embrace new trends towards IoT enabled devices, the physical
complexity and amount of data passing through domestic network is only set to
increase. The domestic access point provides an important means of configura-
tion, visibility and control over this developing infrastructure. This dissertation
demonstrates that reinventing the domestic network to support self-management
by domestic users can resolve the existing problems with domestic networking
infrastructure and merits further research, exploration by industry and standard-
isation bodies.
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